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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters in labor and public
economics.1
The first chapter examines the role of teacher gender in education
production. Drawing on a representative survey of middle-school students and
teachers in China, we focus on schools in which student-teacher assignments
are random. Our results show that having a female teacher raises girls’ test
scores and improves both their mental status and social acclimation relative to
boys. We further find that the effect on test scores is larger for students whose
parents are less educated or have migrated out. There is evidence that female
teachers provide feedback differently to girls and boys, and that having a
female teacher alters girls’ beliefs about commonly held gender stereotypes
and increases their motivation to learn.
The second chapter estimates the gender peer effects on students’
academic performance and noncognitive outcomes. Our findings show that
having a higher proportion of female peers in class improves students’ test
scores and noncognitive outcomes, such as mental stress, social acclimation
and satisfaction, and disciplinary problems. There is evidence in support
of improved classroom environment, teacher-student interactions, and
1 The first two chapters are co-authored with Jie Gong and Yi Lu, and the third chapter is
co-authored with Yue Lv.
xteachers’ level of job satisfaction when there are more female students in the
class. The findings extend the study of gender peer effects from the traditional
focus on academic achievements to noncognitive outcomes, and provide
useful evidence on potential mechanisms.
The third chapter examines the effect of environmental regulation on
firms’ innovation by exploiting the Two Control Zones policy which mandates
stricter environmental regulations in designated cities in China. To measure
innovation, we exploit a unique dataset that contains the detailed information
for each patent application in China from 1994 to 2009. Our
difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the stricter environmental
regulation fosters firms’ innovation, and confirms the weak version of the
Porter hypothesis. We find evidence that stricter environmental regulation
results in more firm’s startups and closures, and increases within-firm
innovation, fixed asset investment and profits. This study contributes to the
literature of Porter hypothesis by carefully addressing the causal inference in
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Chapter 1:
The Effect of Teacher Gender on Students’
Academic and Noncognitive Outcomes
1.1 Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed the reversal of a remarkable gender gap
in education. In the US and many other developed countires, girls outper-
form boys in reading scores, top GPA distribution in high school and college
attendance (Campbell 2000; Vincent-Lancrin 2008; Fortin, Oreopoulos and
Phipps 2015). The international phenomenon of female dominance in aca-
demic achievements raises new questions about the causes of this disparity.
Are the differences primarily biological or nurtured by social influences? Are
certain educational inputs, either from parents or teachers, more suitable for
girls than boys? For instance, is it only by coincidence that females comprise
the majority of teachers in elementary and secondary schools during the period
1
when girls achieve more and behave better than boys?
To gain insight into this question, our paper examines whether teacher gen-
der impacts the learning of girls and boys at the middle-school level. A growing
number of studies have attempted to document the effect of teacher gender
at the primary-school (e.g., Winters, Haight, Swaim and Pickering 2013; An-
tecol, Eren and Ozbeklik 2015); secondary-school (e.g., Ehrenberg, Goldhaber
and Brewer 1995; Nixon and Robinson 1999; Dee 2005, 2007; Winters, Haight,
Swaim and Pickering 2013); and college level (e.g., Canes and Rosen 1995;
Rothstein 1995; Neumark and Gardecki 1998; Bettinger and Long 2005; Hoff-
mann and Oreopoulos 2009; Carrell, Page and West 2010). These studies tend
to focus on the impact on student academic performance, and find that having
a female teacher improves female students’ educational outcomes. In contrast,
relatively less research has examined the effects of teacher gender on students’
noncognitive outcomes—e.g., attitudes, preferences, and socio-emotional fac-
tors. The mechanisms behind teacher-student gender interactions have also
limited empirical support.
We attempt to fill these gaps in the literature. First, we extend student
outcomes from traditionally focused academic achievements to noncognitive
2
outcomes. Since Jencks et al. (1979), a number of studies have documented the
importance of noncognitive skills in explaining academic achievement, labor
market success, and other significant life outcomes (Heckman and Rubinstein
2001; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev 2013; Flossmann, Piatek and Wichert
2008; Segal 2013; Bertrand and Pan 2013). To understand the role of school
influence on noncognitive outcomes, we focus on the middle-school period, as
this is the age at which noncognitive skills are thought to develop and mature
(Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman and Ter Weel 2008; Heckman and Kautz
2013).
Our second contribution is to uncover the mechanisms by which gender
interactions between teacher and student lead to differential outcomes for girls
and boys. Do teachers have a preference for same-gender students so that they
provide differential attention or responses to students depending on gender?
Or, given the same teaching behaviors, do girls and boys react and respond to
instruction in different ways? Understanding these mechanisms is important
when designing policies to mitigate gender differences at school (Dee 2004,
2007; Carrell, Page and West 2010). It may be especially relevant when it is
difficult to change the gender composition mix of a school’s instructors. Our
3
research provides insight into this question by using unique data on teacher
behavior and student beliefs to directly test how a teacher’s behavior differs
by student gender as well as how students’ beliefs and motivations related to
learning are influenced by their teacher’s gender.
We use a nationally representative survey of middle-school teachers and
students in China and focus on schools in which the assignment of students to
classrooms is random. This allows us to mitigate potential selection problems—
e.g., high-achieving or better-motivated female students are more likely to be
assigned to female teachers. By comparing the outcomes of girls and boys
taught by female versus male teachers, we are able to estimate whether, and
how, teacher gender affects female and male students’ outcomes differently.
Our results show that although teacher gender has little impact on boys,
it has a strong effect on girls, in both academic and noncognitive outcomes.
On academic performance, our estimates confirm a reverse gender gap: Girls
outperform boys on test scores. What is immediately remarkable is how female
teachers increase the gender gap by improving girls’ scores relative to boys’.
Teacher gender has little impact on boys’ test scores, but girls’ scores increase
by about 14.4% of a standard deviation when taught by a female. The results
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are robust to the inclusion of various student- and teacher-level controls.
Notably, having a female teacher also improves girls’ self assessment of their
learning. When taught by a male teacher, although girls’ absolute grades are
higher than boys’, their self-assessed outcomes are not, which reflects a gender
gap in confidence about academic achievement. Having a female teacher signif-
icantly increases girls’ self-assessed scores relative to boys’, and the magnitude
of the difference is even larger than the effect on girls’ actual test scores.
The pattern for students’ noncognitive outcomes is subtler. If taught by a
male, girls are more likely to feel depressed, blue, or unhappy at school than
boys. Female teachers can overturn the gender gap: They do not seem to affect
boys’ outcomes, but significantly improve girls’ mental status. In addition, we
find strong evidence that female teachers improve girls’ overall satisfaction at
school, as well as their social acclimation with classmates.
Examining the mechanisms that drive these results, we find evidence for
both teacher- and student-based channels. Specifically, we find that female
teachers tend to ask more questions, give more praise, and make fewer crit-
ical comments to girls. In addition, we find that the presence of a female
teacher counters the perception that girls are not as strong in math, and bet-
5
ter motivates girls to study the subject. Overall, our findings support both
the stereotype-threat hypothesis and role-model theories.
In the last part of our empirical analysis, we examine whether students
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are more sensitive to the influence of
teacher gender. Our findings suggest that when the mother is less educated,
the student is an ethnic minority, or the parent migrated out and left the
student behind, teacher gender has a much stronger impact on students’ test
scores. These patterns are consistent with the premise that disadvantaged
students receive less parental investment, so school-based influences play a
more important role in their skill development.
Our findings provide new evidence that teacher gender has a significant
influence on student outcomes at the middle-school level. This reinforces pre-
vious findings regarding the impact of teacher gender on student grades, and
also contributes to the literature on the effect on middle school students in par-
ticular. Some studies have found that having a female teacher positively affects
female middle-school students’ achievement (Nixon and Robinson 1999; Dee
2007; Winters, Haight, Swaim and Pickering 2013), while others have found
no effect (Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer 1995). Our study also extends
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previous research by using a setting with randomized student assignment. To
our knowledge, only Dee (2004), Carrell, Page and West (2010), and Antecol,
Eren and Ozbeklik (2015) use randomized or experimental data to account
for endogenous assignment, using data from the Project STAR, the US Air
Force Academy, and the National Evaluation of Teach for America (NETFA),
respectively.1 Our estimates are based on randomized student assignments
and a more representative sample of middle-school students and teachers, and
therefore are arguably more general from a policy perspective.
More broadly, we also contribute to the literature on how school environ-
ment influences noncognitive skills. Previous studies highlight the central role
of school choice and school social networks. For instance, Cullen, Jacob and
Levitt (2006) find that gaining access to sought-after public schools improves
students’ behavioral outcomes, as evidenced by a lower level of disciplinary
incidents and arrest rates. Angrist, Bettinger and Kremer (2006) find that
winners of vouchers for private schools in Colombia were more likely to fin-
ish the 8th grade, worked less, and were less likely to marry or cohabit as
teenagers than those who did not win vouchers. Lavy (2010) evaluates a pro-
1Several studies deal with the selection problem by making within-student and within-
teacher comparisons. See, for example, Dee (2007), Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009) and
Fairlie, Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2014).
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gram of free choice among public schools in Tel Aviv, Israel, and finds better
student behavioral outcomes, such as more positive teacher-student relation-
ships, better social acclimation and satisfaction at school, and less violence and
disruption in the classroom. Lavy and Sand (2015) exploit conditional random
assignment in middle schools in Tel Aviv, Israel, and find that social networks
have positive effects on students’ noncognitive behavioral outcomes: greater
cooperation, reduction in violent behavior and improvements in social satis-
faction in class. Our study complements the literature by providing evidence
of how one component of the educational experience, teacher gender, influ-
ences student noncognitive outcomes. An important advantage of our study
is that our findings are not limited to a particular type of school—i.e., public
or private—because the estimates stem from within-school comparisons.
1.2 Data and Variables
In the Chinese educational system, middle-school students are assigned to
classrooms at the beginning of the 7th grade and take the same courses
throughout their three years of middle school. Students are required to take
three core subjects—Chinese, mathematics, and English—and a set of sub-
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sidiary subjects. During a regular school day, students remain in the same
classroom all day and different teachers come to the classroom to deliver
subject-specific lectures. A head teacher, who is usually one of the core-
subject teachers, oversees the activities and individual student progress for
a given classroom. While the subject teachers ensure that students achieve
their learning goals, the head teacher is also responsible for all class matters
and students’ social lives—e.g., setting seating plans, organizing extracurric-
ular events, and overseeing student discipline. In addition, the head teacher
regularly gives feedback to students and their parents regarding academic per-
formance and behavior.
We obtained data from the 2014 China Education Panel Survey (CEPS),
a nationally representative survey that covers middle schools from 28 counties
and city districts.2 Our sample includes 8,988 students in the 7th and 9th
grades, across 208 distinct classrooms and 67 schools. Data for each student’s
demographic characteristics are collected from student questionnaires. Table
1 reports the summary statistics for our main outcome and control variables.
2CEPS is the first and largest nationally representative education survey in China. Of-
ficially started in 2013, the survey applies a stratified sampling design in which four middle
schools and four classrooms within each school are chosen to represent a given county or
city district.
9
[Insert Table 1.1 here]
Our academic performance measures are student exam scores in the core
subjects, provided by their respective school administration offices. These
subjects—Chinese, mathematics, and English—are the main components in
the standards tests for admission to senior high school. Within a school,
teachers who teach the same subject use the same syllabus and give the same
exams during a common testing period. Test scores in the core subjects are
therefore a consistent measure of academic achievement across students from
the same grade in the same school.3 We supplement our test score measures
with self-assessed performance scores collected from the student questionnaire,
on which students were asked to report whether they have difficulty in learning
each subject on a scale from 1 (a lot) to 4 (not at all).
To measure student noncognitive outcomes, we use student responses to
eight questionnaire items. Four questions relate to feelings of stress; specifi-
cally, whether during the previous seven days the student felt (1) depressed,
3Exams are graded in a rigorous and consistent manner with each student’s name, class,
and ID information hidden from the grader. Within a grade at the same school, teachers
divide the grading work so that the same question is typically graded by the same teacher
using a consistent standard.
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(2) blue, (3) unhappy, or (4) that life is meaningless. The remaining questions
relate to a student’s perceptions of his/her social acclimation and general sat-
isfaction levels at school; specifically, (5) whether the student feels that school
life is rich and fulfilling, (6) whether the student feels confident about his/her
future, (7) how often the student goes to museums, zoos, or science parks with
classmates from school, and (8) how often the student goes to movies, plays,
or sporting events with classmates from school.4
Our main teacher-level variable of interest is gender. In addition, we obtain
from teacher questionnaires information about which subject each respondent
taught; his/her education level, marital status, and years of teaching experi-
ence at the current school; and years in the profession. Our summary statistics
show that 64.9% of head teachers and 77.9% of subject teachers in our sample
are female. Within each core subject, female teachers are also more common
than male teachers: 75.9% in Chinese, 65.9% in math, and 91.6% in English.5
4For items (1) to (4), respondents were asked to report the frequency of incidents on a
scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always). For items (5) and (6), they were asked to rate how much
they agree with the statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
For items (7) and (8), they were asked to rate how much they agree with the statement on
scale from 1 (never) to 6 (always). In regression analysis, the variables are normalized to
have means of zero and standard deviations of one.
5Our observed female dominance in secondary school teachers is a global phenomenon.




1.3.1 Class Assignment and Regression Sample
Our research question concerns the effect of teacher gender on student out-
comes. Understanding how students are matched to teachers and classrooms
is therefore critical to our estimation and analysis. Middle schools in China
use various methods to assign students. In some schools, prior to beginning
their first academic year, students take placement exams and their scores are
used to assign them to classrooms. In other schools, students are assigned
based on local residency.
More recently, an increasingly large number of schools have begun to em-
ploy random assignment to place students to classrooms. This approach is
heavily promoted by the Ministry of Education as ensuring equal and fair op-
portunity for all students during their compulsory education years (through
the 9th grade). Schools that use randomized assignments typically rely on
a computer program that can incorporate information on class size, gender,
migrant status, and other dimensions to ensure proper balance in the random-
ization process. Alternatively, if enrollment is small and manageable, parents
of incoming students are invited to draw lots to determine their child’s class
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placement. In these cases, once student assignments have been determined,
the head and subject teachers also draw lots to determine which classrooms
they will teach and manage.
In this study, we focus on schools in which students are randomly assigned
to classrooms. We require that a school’s class assignment procedure to meet
three conditions: (i) the school principal reports that students are randomly
assigned to classrooms; (ii) after students have been assigned to classrooms
at the beginning of the 7th grade, the school does not rearrange their classes
for grades 8 and 9; and (iii) all head teachers in the same grade report that
students in the respective grade are not assigned by test scores.6 Using our
criteria, we find that 59.8% of the schools in the 2014 CEPS database assign
classes randomly, translating into a sample of 8,988 students across 208 class-
rooms and 67 schools. Since each student in our sample is randomly matched
to both a head teacher and subject teachers, and stays in the same class for
the next three years, our sample mitigates any potential concerns regarding
6The criteria are based on reports in the teacher questionnaire. For the first condition,
all school principals were asked to report which of the following assignment rules they used
to place students: (a) based on pre-enrollment test scores, (b) based on students’ residential
status, (c) random assignment, or (d) based on other factors. We restrict our sample to
schools that use (c). Second, the same principals were asked whether their schools rearrange
classes for grades 8 and 9; we exclude those that do so. Finally, each head teacher was asked
whether students in the grade level taught are assigned by test scores; again, we drop the
entire grade if any head teacher answers “yes”.
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self-selection of students to classrooms or teachers.
To verify the randomness of class assignment for our sample, we conduct
a balancing test between classrooms with a female head teacher and those
with a male head teacher using several baseline characteristics (i.e., values
that are determined before the class assignment). If the assignment process
is truly random, these two groups of students should be similar across the
observed characteristics. We include the following student characteristic vari-
ables: Female (1 if a student is a female and 0 otherwise), Age, Minority
(1 if a student belongs to a minority ethnic group and 0 otherwise), Local
Residence (1 if a student is local and 0 otherwise), Only Child (1 if a stu-
dent is the only child in the family and 0 otherwise), Attend Kindergarten
(1 if a student attended kindergarten and 0 otherwise), Repeat in Primary
School (1 if a student repeated a grade in primary school and 0 otherwise),
Academic Ranking in Primary School (ranking of academic performance in
primary school), Mother Education (mother’s years of schooling), and Father
Education (father’s years of schooling). Our classroom-related baseline vari-
ables are: Proportion of Other Female Subject Teachers (percentage of female
subject non-head teachers), Chinese Teacher’s Teaching Experience (years of
14
teaching), Math Teacher’s Teaching Experience (years of teaching), English
Teacher’s Teaching Experience (years of teaching), and Class Size (number of
students).
Panel A of Table 1.2 reports test results using student characteristic vari-
ables. For each variable, we report the mean and standard deviation of classes
with female head teachers and those with male head teachers in columns 1 and
2, respectively. Column 3 presents raw differences between the two groups.
As random assignment is performed within a school, we further report condi-
tional differences controlling for school fixed effects in column 4, which allows
us to control for all possible selection by students among schools in the cross-
sectional data. While there are several statistically significant unconditional
differences across the two groups of classes, these differences disappear once
we control for school fixed effects. Also, all of the differences are economi-
cally insignificant. These results suggest that the student characteristics in
our sample are well balanced across classes managed by female versus male
head teachers.
[Insert Table 1.2 here]
Table 1.2, Panel B, shows the balance of classroom characteristics. When we
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include school fixed effects, none of the five classroom variables—proportion of
female subject teachers, experience of the three core-subject teachers, or class
size—shows any statistically or economically significant differences between
classes with female head teachers and male head teachers.
As the focus of our analysis is on the interactions between student gender
and teacher gender, there may still be concern that the teacher-student match
is based on unobservable along both teacher and student gender. For example,
if within the same grade or school the principal puts strong girls in a class
with a female teacher but also assign the weak boys to her class, we could still
get seemingly balanced results on female teacher in Table 1.2 as the selection
cancels out when one pools both student genders. To this end, we further check
the balance of gender difference between classes with female head teachers
and those with male head teachers in Appendix Table A1.1. Specifically, we
regress all of the students’ pre-determined characteristics used in Table 1.2 on
student gender, teacher gender, and their interactions, along with school fixed
effects. This is the same estimation specification we employ to estimate teacher
gender effects (see the next section for more details). With the exception of
ethnicity, all of coefficients on female student and female teacher interactions
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are insignificant. In addition, all magnitudes are economically insignficant.
Taken together, these results largely confirm that students taught by a
female head teacher have characteristics and classroom environments similar to
those taught by a male head teacher. Nonetheless, we include all these student-
level predetermined characteristics in the later analyses to further improve
the balance between the two groups of classrooms, as well as our estimation
efficiency.
1.3.2 Estimation Framework
To estimate the effect of teacher gender on student academic and noncognitive
outcomes, we use the following regression model.
Yics = α+β1Femstudics+β2Femteachcs+β3Femteachcs×Femstudics+W ′icsφ+Ds+εics
(1)
where Yics is the outcome measure for student i in class c of school s; Femstudics
is an indicator for whether the student is female; Femteachcs is an indicator
for whether the teacher for class c of school s is female; and εics is the er-
ror term. We cluster standard errors at the class level, accounting for any
17
correlation in outcomes for students in the same class.
The β coefficients are the main coefficients of interest. β1 captures the
difference in mean academic performance and noncognitive outcomes between
female and male students when they have a male teacher. β2 captures the value
added by having a female teacher, and β3 captures the effect of teacher gender
on student gender differences. An unbiased estimation of the β coefficients
requires that conditional on the controls, Femteachcs and Femstudics are
uncorrelated with the error term εics. These identifying assumptions hold in
a setting of random class assignment, which is verified in the previous section.
In particular, as random class assignment is conducted within a school and
students may nonrandomly select their middle school, we include school fixed
effects Ds in the regressions to control for all school-level factors in our cross-
sectional data that may influence students’ school selection decisions.
1.4 Main Results
1.4.1 Teacher Gender and Student Academic Performance
Table 1.3 presents our estimates of the effects of core-subject teachers’ gender
on student academic performance. Columns 1 and 2 present results using
18
test scores as the performance measure while columns 3 and 4 present results
using self-assessed performance as the outcome variable. Both test scores and
self-assessed scores are normalized by subject, grade and school; therefore,
both variables have means of zero and standard deviations of one. We include
subject fixed effects and school fixed effects in all regressions, and student-level
control variables for the results in columns 2 and 4.
[Insert Table 1.3 here]
Baseline estimates on test scores (columns 1 and 2) establish two facts: Girls
outperform boys in course tests, and the gender difference is enhanced by
teacher gender. The coefficients on female-student dummy are positive and
significant, which confirms that girls achieve higher scores than boys (19.4%
of a standard deviation). This is consistent with previous evidence on female
dominance in academic performance.7
The more intriguing findings are that female teachers enlarge the gender
difference—that is, they improve girls’ scores more relative to boys. The es-
7A similar reverse gender gap has been found among students in the U.S. and Sweden.
US educational statistics report that between 1973 and 1999, female students consistently
dominated male students in reading scores, while the gender gap in mathematics decreased
and became insignificant (Campbell 2000). The Swedish National Agency for Education
(2004) reports that girls score significantly higher than boys on Swedish and English tests,
and there is no obvious gender difference in mathematics scores (Holmlund and Sund 2008).
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timated coefficients on the female-teacher dummy variable are negative but
insignificant, suggesting that teacher gender has little impact on boys’ test
scores. In contrast, estimated coefficients on the interaction between female
teacher and female student are positive—14.4% of a standard deviation—and
precisely estimated. These results imply that female teachers substantially
improve girls’ test scores relative to boys. The absolute gain to girls from
having a female teacher is about 10.4% of a standard deviation (0.144-0.040).
An interesting finding from students’ self-assessment scores (columns 3
and 4) is that although girls’ absolute grades are higher than boys’, their self-
assessed outcomes are not. This reflects a gender gap in confidence about
academic achievement. Female teachers help reduce the gap: They raise girls’
self-assessment by 27.3% of a standard deviation relative to boys, which trans-
late into an absolute gain to girls of about 15.6% of a standard deviation
(0.273-0.117). The presence of female teachers seems to have a greater effect
on girls’ self-assessment than it does on actual scores, suggesting that teacher
gender plays an important role in students’ mental and behavioral outcomes.
In terms of economic magnitude, our estimates imply that having a fe-
male subject teacher raises girls’ test scores by 14.4% of a standard deviation
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and their self-assessment by 27.3% of a standard deviation, relative to boys.
Our findings are consistent with existing evidence on teacher-student gender
dynamics in higher education (middle school and above). More specifically,
at the middle-school level, our findings confirm the results of Dee (2007) and
Winters et al. (2013), which show that assignment to a female teacher signif-
icantly improves girls’ test scores relative to boys. Our estimates may seem
high relative to the effects they document;8 this could partly be due to the dif-
ferences in the sample we consider and to the randomized setting of our data.
Specifically, we examine middle schools in China, the economy and education
system of which are different from—and plausibly less developed—than the
US schools Dee (2007) and Winters et al. (2013) study. In addition, we use
random assignment and control for block or classroom fixed effects. The two
studies cited above, on the other hand, used nonrandom data and acknowledge
that the magnitudes of the effects in their analysis may potentially be biased.
Further evidence to suggest this is provided by our robustness check in Section
4.4: When we repeat the analysis using nonrandomized classrooms, estimated
effects are indeed smaller in magnitude.
8Using conservative estimates, teacher gender effects—i.e., the increase in girls’ test scores
relative to boys when taught by a female teacher—are about 5.4% in Dee (2007) and 0.8%
in Winters et al. (2013).
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1.4.2 Teacher Gender and Students’ Noncognitive Out-
comes
To estimate the effects of the head teacher’s gender on students’ noncognitive
outcomes, we normalize each of the eight noncognitive outcome variables to
obtain a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.9 When reporting the
results, we group the outcome variables into two sets: the level of mental stress
and the level of social acclimation and satisfaction. Following Kling, Liebman
and Katz (2007), we also calculate the average effect size (AES) for each
category to supplement the estimated effect on a specific outcome measure.10
Table 1.4A presents the estimated effects on students’ mental stress. First,
the estimated coefficients on the female student dummy variables are mostly
positive with the exception of a negative yet insignificant coefficient for the
likelihood of feeling pessimistic. These results indicate that girls are more
likely to feel depressed, blue, or unhappy than boys when their head teacher
9We focus on the gender of a student’s head teacher as the head teacher is more involved
in students’ activities at school than are subject teachers. Also, a student’s noncognitive
outcomes do not vary by subject. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we include the
proportion of female teachers (both head and subject teachers) as an alternative measure
of teacher gender and report the results in Section 4.3 and Appendix Table A3.
10Specifically, we define the average effect size (AES) of the interaction between female
teacher dummy and female student dummy on category c as AES = 1nc
∑nc
n=1 ekc/σkc,
where nc is the number of outcomes in category c (for our noncognitive categories, 4), ekc
is the estimated effect for outcome k of category c, and σkc is the standard deviation of the
outcome variables.
22
is male. Second, estimates of the female-teacher dummy variable are negative,
suggesting that a female head teacher tends to improve boys’ mental status,
though this is not statistically significant. Finally, and most importantly,
estimated coefficients on the female teacher × female student interaction are
negative, indicating that having a female head teacher significantly reduces
girls’ mental stress relative to boys. Estimates are statistically significant for
students’ likelihood of feeling depressed, blue, or unhappy, as is the AES.
[Insert Table 1.4A here]
Table 1.4B shows the estimated effects on students’ social acclimation and sat-
isfaction. When controlling for student-level characteristics, estimated coeffi-
cients on the female student dummies are negative for most measures (except
for “fulfilling of life” which is close to zero and not statistically significant),
suggesting that girls are less satisfied with school life, less confident about the
future, and less likely to hang out with classmates when their head teacher
is male. In contrast, having a female teacher is associated with greater sat-
isfaction, confidence, and acclimation for boys, although these effects are not
significant. Finally, we find that our estimates for female teacher × female stu-
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dent interaction are positive and significant, suggesting that relative to boys,
girls have greater satisfaction and acclimation at school when their teacher is
female.
[Insert Table 1.4B here]
One concern regarding students’ noncognitive outcomes is that they might be
correlated with students’ academic performance. For instance, high achievers
are more likely to feel confident and satisfied in school, whereas students who
perform worse on academic tests are more prone to mental stress. If such
correlations are strong, then a teacher’s gender influences students’ noncog-
nitive outcomes primarily through the effects on academic performance. To
separate the direct effect from the indirect effect via academic performance,
we add students’ test scores as controls for noncognitive outcomes. As shown
in Table 1.4C, the estimates remain almost the same after controlling for test
scores. In other words, holding test scores constant, having a female teacher
still contributes to positive feelings of mental health, school satisfaction, and
social acclimation for girls relative to boys.
[Insert Table 1.4C here]
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The findings across various specifications suggest that girls have lower noncog-
nitive outcomes than boys—worse mental status, weaker confidence and lower
satisfication at school—when they are assigned to male teachers. A female
teacher can reduce, or even overturn the gender gap by improving girls’ noncog-
nitive measures relative to boys.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
We conduct several robustness checks on various estimation concerns, includ-
ing an alternative measure of teacher gender, adding more fixed effects in our
specification, and testing sample attrition.
First, in our main analyses, we use the gender of the core subject teacher
in estimating the effect of teacher gender on student academic performance.
Considering the intensive interaction between head teacher and students, it is
also possible that the gender of a student’s head teacher affects that student’s
academic achievement. To address this possibility, we include a dummy vari-
able indicating the gender of the head teacher as well as its interaction with
student gender. The results in Appendix Table A1.2 show that estimates of
the subject-teacher gender effect (coefficients of the interaction between female
subject teacher and female student) remains significant and are even slightly
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larger than our baseline estimate reported in Table 1.3. The coefficients on
female head teacher are positive and significant, but those on the female head
teacher and female student interaction term are negative and insignificant.
Thus, we conclude that while the gender of a student’s head teacher affects
students’ academic achievement, it does not seem to enlarge or correct the
gender gap.
Second, we use the proportion of female teachers in a classroom as an al-
ternative measure of teacher gender. Our baseline specification uses a dummy
variable to indicate whether the head or subject teacher is female. Here, we
calculate the proportion of female teachers by teacher gender and self-reported
working hours with students. The more hours a female teacher spends with
students, the more intensive the female teacher-student interaction. Appendix
Table A1.3 reports the results. Consistent with baseline results, we find that
the larger share of student-teacher interaction spent with female teachers, the
less likely that girls feel depressed, blue, or unhappy and the more likely that
girls have better acclimation and satisfaction relative to boys. Overall, we find
that our results are not sensitive to the alternative measure of teacher gender.
Third, we test whether our main findings are robust to the inclusion of (1)
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student fixed effects; (2) grade (7th or 9th) fixed effects; and (3) teacher-level
control variables.11 As shown in Appendix Tables A1.4-A1.5, the estimated
effect of teacher gender remains significant and similar to the baseline esti-
mates.
Fourth, we estimate teacher gender effects separately for 7th and 9th
graders. In doing so, we include only one grade from each school, and therefore
block fixed effects collapse to school fixed effects and we cluster standard errors
at the school level accordingly. Tables A1.6 report regression results for aca-
demic outcomes and noncognitive skills. We find that the effects on academic
outcomes hold for both 7th and 9th graders, with the latter showing larger
effects. For noncognitive outcomes, we find that results are only significant for
the 9th graders, while estimates for the 7th graders are small and statistically
insignificant. These results may reflect the importance of teacher-student in-
teraction, in that 9th graders have had two more years with their teachers
than 7th graders. One may expect that the stronger the “treatment”—i.e.,
longer and more teacher-student interactions—the larger the impact teachers
11We include student fixed effects in estimating the impact on students’ academic out-
comes but not noncognitive skills. This is due to the fact that we observe a student’s
academic outcomes in multiple subjects, but there is no within-student variation in noncog-
nitive measures.
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have on students’ development and achievements.
Last, we address the potential issue of sample attrition; that is, missing
values on student and teacher variables. Specifically, our estimates would be
biased if teacher gender affects the likelihood of missing values. We regress an
attrition dummy on teacher’s gender, student gender, and school fixed effects.
As shown in Appendix Table A1.6, the coefficients on teacher gender are close
to zero and not statistically significant, indicating that our results are unlikely
to be driven by teacher gender.
1.5 Mechanism
Our main results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that relative to male students,
female students’ test scores and noncognitive outcomes are substantially bet-
ter when they are taught by female teachers. In this section, we investigate
possible mechanisms through which teacher gender affects female and male
students outcomes differently.
1.5.1 Teacher Gender or Other Characteristics
We start by examining whether our documented gender differences in student
performance are primarily driven by teacher gender per se, or, by other teacher
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characteristics correlated with teacher gender. For instance, students may re-
spond differently to younger versus older teachers. To address the relevance of
teachers’ professional characteristics, we follow the approach used by Carrell,
Page and West (2010).12 Specifically, we add the interactions between stu-
dent/teacher gender dummies with the following teacher-level variables: age,
marital status, years of schooling, whether they earned their degree from a nor-
mal college, experience in the profession, experience as a head teacher, prior
experience as a subject teacher, and credential status. Including these inter-
actions can identify whether certain teacher characteristics affect female and
male students differently. As shown in Table 1.5, we see that the estimate for
teacher gender effect is similar to our baseline estimates. These results suggest
that observed effects are driven primarily by a teacher’s gender, rather than
other teacher characteristics.
[Insert Table 1.5 here]
12Carrell, Page and West (2010) also analyze a teacher’s value added to distinguish teacher
gender effects from other teacher characteristics effect. However, this approach requires
multiple observations of a teacher, which is not applicable in our setting.
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1.5.2 The Role of Teacher Gender: Teacher Behavior and
Student Response
Given that teacher gender drives our results, we examine whether this effect
is due to teacher behavior or student responses. Regarding teacher behavior,
it is possible that teachers may prefer students of a particular race, ethnicity,
or gender, leading to different behaviors depending on student characteristics.
For instance, teachers may provide more feedback or time to students of the
same gender (Jones and Dindia 2004).13 Relatedly, female and male teachers
may differ in their teaching styles or communication strategies, which may be
better suited to students of their own gender.
Regarding student response, it is possible that students may perceive teach-
ers differently based on the teacher’s gender. For example, the role-model ef-
fect suggests that students feel more comfortable, inspired, and focused in
class when a same-gender teacher is present, independent of the teacher’s
other qualities and behaviors.14 Similarly, girls may feel less threatened by
stereotypes if they have a female teacher. In this case, a same-gender teacher
13In a similar view, Ferguson (1995) shows that in allocating class time and materials,
teachers are more oriented to students of the same race.
14The literature on role-model effects is relatively rich; see, for example, Rothstein (1995),
Canes and Rosen (1995), Jacobs (1996), and Diprete and Buchmann (2006).
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will be perceived by students as a counterargument to commonly-held gender
stereotypes—e.g., that girls are less talented than boys in mathematics—that
may otherwise hinder girls in their ability to perform at their maximum level.15
Our rich data allow us to directly test and separate these two classes of
explanations. We first examine whether teachers behave differently toward
female and male students. On questionnaires, students were asked to describe
their interactions with their subject and head teachers on dimensions such
as class questioning and the provision of praise and criticism.16 As shown in
Table 6, we find that compared to a male teacher, a female head teacher is
less likely to criticize girls than boys, and that a female subject teacher is
more likely to question and praise girls than boys. The results remain similar
after controlling for students’ test scores. In other words, holding students’
academic performance constant, there is still differential treatment by teachers
based on student gender, in that female teachers provide more attention and
15The stereotype-threat hypothesis (Steele 1997; Spencer, Steele and Quinn 1999) is sup-
ported by experimental evidence (Steele and Aronson 1995), in which female students under-
perform on a math test only when they are told that the test reveals gender differences.
16The four items ask students to rate how much they agree with the following statements
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree): (1) The subject teacher always
asks the student to answer questions in class, (2) The subject teacher always praises the
student in class, (3) The head teacher always criticizes the student, and (4) The head teacher
always praises the student. In the regression analyses, we normalize each variable to have a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
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positive feedback to girls than boys.
[Insert Table 1.6 here]
Next, we test students’ perceptions of and responses to their teachers’ gender.
Table 1.7 presents evidence on the stereotype-threat hypothesis and role-model
effects. Panel A reports the teacher gender effect on students’ belief that “boys
are more talented in learning math than girls.” Our results show that when
mathematics is taught by a female teacher, female students are less likely to
agree with the stereotype about a gender gap in learning math. Exposure
to a female teacher who counters the stereotype appears to increase female
students’ confidence, which may contribute to our observed improvements in
performance.
To examine the relevance of role-model effects, we check whether a teacher’s
gender influences students’ views about the usefulness of the subject for their
future.17 The role-model effect implies that students feel more inspired when
taught by a same-gender teacher. From Table 1.7, Panel B, we see that while
male students’ perceptions do not vary significantly by teacher gender, female
17The survey item asks the students to rate, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4
(strongly agree), how much the student agrees with the statement that “the subject is useful
for my future.”
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students are more likely to consider a subject relevant and useful for their
future when the subject is taught by a female. We interpret this result as
evidence to support the idea that a female teacher functions as a role model
who inspires her female students.
[Insert Table 1.7 here]
Taken together, we find evidence for both teacher- and student-based chan-
nels. Our findings reveal teachers’ differential behaviors depending on student
gender; and their roles in countering stereotypes and inspiring same-gender
students. Results are all robust to the inclusion of student characteristics and
test scores. These findings, therefore, help to explain how female teachers
improve girls’ academic and noncognitive development.
1.6 Heterogeneous Effects
Our main findings, which are reported in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 capture the
average effects of teacher gender on student outcomes. In this section, we
examine whether the effects vary according to student background. In the
spirit of Cunha and Heckman (2007), students develop skills through various
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investments—e.g., parenting, schooling, environment—and the returns from
these investments are interdependent. In this case, a teacher’s influence may
vary by the student’s parental investment.
We explore differential effects across three dimensions: parents’ education
(proxied by mother’s years of schooling), student ethnicity, and whether the
student’s parents migrated out.18 As shown in Table 1.8, we find that the
female teacher effect is stronger for disadvantaged students. For instance, we
find that having a female teacher raises left-behind girls’ test scores by 29.6%
of a standard deviation relative to boys, compared to the increase of 9.8% of
a standard deviation observed for girls with both parents around. We further
find that the coefficients on the “female teacher × female student” interaction
are statistically different between the three pairs of subgroups: students whose
mothers have more than 9 years of school versus those with less educated
mothers, ethnic majority versus minority, and students who live with their
parents versus those who were left behind by migrant parents.
[Insert Table 1.8 here]
18For mother’s education, we use 9 years of schooling as the cutoff since it is the sample
median. Results are similar if we use father’s education instead.
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In terms of noncognitive outcomes, we find that the teacher gender effects (co-
efficients of the interaction term) are higher for disadvantaged students across
all the measures of mental health (Table 1.9, Panel A), but comparisons of
coefficients between subgroups are not statistically significant. The differences
between subgroups in social acclimation and satisfaction at school are less
pronounced (Table 1.9, Panel B). Because the effects do not differ statistically
between subgroups, we should interpret heterogeneous effects with caution.
[Insert Table 1.9 here]
Overall, we find evidence that the female teacher effect on test scores is stronger
for students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, which may reflect less
parental input for these students. As a result, these students are more sensitive
to their school environments and more influenced by their teachers in learning
and development outcomes. These results reinforce other studies’ finding that
disadvantaged students are more likely to be affected by the gender composi-
tion of their peers and class size (Angrist and Lavy 1999; Lavy and Schlosser
2011). An implication of the heterogenous effect is that school-related policies
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that target disadvantaged students may have large returns.19
1.7 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on how teacher gender impacts student outcomes. We
use random assignment of students to waive concerns about self-selection in
student-teacher matching. Our data allow us to extend student outcomes
from traditionally focused academic achievements to noncognitive and behav-
ioral outcomes. A further advantage of our study is that various measures
of teacher and student perceptions and behaviors are used to separate the
possible mechanisms that drive the main effect of teacher gender.
Our findings suggest that having a female teacher improves both academic
performance and noncognitive outcomes more for girls than for boys. On
student test scores, our results show a reverse gender gap, which is enforced
when taught by female teachers. This teacher gender effect is stronger among
students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. On noncognitive outcomes,
girls tend to be more mentally stressed and less satisfied at school if they are
taught by male teachers. However, female teachers can overturn this gender
19We also investigate the heterogeneous effects by teacher’s background such as education
and experience, and find no significant difference.
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gap. Examining the mechanisms that drive these results, we find evidence of
teacher behavior that varies depending on student gender, as well as student
perception of teachers as role models and counterexamples to gender stereo-
types.
Our study has a number of implications for educators and policymakers.
First, our findings provide useful information for policy makers who seek to
balance gender representation among middle-school teachers. Second, our re-
sults provide insight for teachers regarding the differential impact of classroom
actions such as questioning and praising or criticizing girls versus boys.
Our findings can also be used to broaden our understanding of the nature
and sources of boys’ academic difficulties (e.g., Bertrand and Pan 2013; Corn-
well, Mustard and Van Parys 2013; Fortin, Oreopoulos and Phipps 2015). It
is commonly observed and recognized that boys are more likely to have behav-
ioral and socio-emotional difficulties such as problems, with self-control, which
may limit their ability to obtain high grades. Our findings may help schools
understand how teacher behaviors can contribute to a more gender-neutral
school environment.
While this study has provided insight into the role of teacher gender at
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the middle school level, future research could investigate several important
questions. For example, it would be valuable to study the long-term effects of
teacher gender on students. Do these effects decline or persist to later edu-
cation, and even adulthood? It would also be interesting to examine whether
students are more affected by their most recent teachers or by teachers they
had during pivotal stages of development, such as middle school. Finally,
future studies could examine how teacher gender interacts with other school
environment factors, such as peer influence. Answers to these questions would
offer valuable insights into the effects of school context on children’s develop-
ment and long-term achievements.
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Chapter 2:
Gender Peer Effects on Students’ Academic and
Noncognitive Outcomes: Evidence and
Mechanisms
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how the gender composition of the class affects stu-
dents’ academic and noncognitve outcomes. Researchers and policymakers
have long believed that peer effects—e.g., gender, race, quality and social
background—are among the most important determinants of student outcomes
(e.g., Sacerdote 2001, Zimmerman 2003, Angrist and Lang 2004, Arcidiacono
and Nicholson 2005, Ammermueller and Pischke 2009, Carrell, Fullerton and
West 2009, Gould, Lavy and Daniele Paserman 2009).1 Understanding the
interaction of gender in the educational production function is particularly
relevant for optimal grouping of students into schools and classrooms, and
1See Epple and Romano (2011) for an extensive review of the literature.
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may shed light on the debate between single-sex and co-educational schools.
Along this line, previous studies have highlighted the influence of the presence
of girls on peers’ academic outcomes. For example, Hoxby (2000) shows that
a higher proportion of girls in the class raises students test scores in public
elementary schools in Texas. Lavy and Schlosser (2011) extend the level of
education to middle and high schools and further uncover the mechanisms—
improved classroom environment and better inter-student and teacher-student
relationships—behind the positive externalities. Black, Devereux and Salvanes
(2013) examine the role of peer composition on students’ long run outcomes,
and find that having a higher proportion of girls in the class reduces boys’
probability onto an academic high school track and their long-term completed
years of schooling.
In contrast to the established effects on students’ academic achievements,
little is known about how peers influence each other’s noncognitive outcomes.
We attempt to fill this gap in the literature by utilizing unique data on indi-
vidual students’ mental health, social acclimation, and misbehavior in school.
These outcomes are not only interesting for providing a complete picture of
students development through schooling, but also for being good predictors
40
of people’s long-run wellbeing. Since Jencks et al. (1979), studies have docu-
mented the importance of noncognitive skills in explaining academic achieve-
ment, labor market success, and other significant life outcomes (Heckman and
Rubinstein 2001; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev 2013; Segal 2013; Bertrand
and Pan 2013). We therefore attempt to push the boundary of student out-
comes and explicitly consider students’ noncognitive skills as a form of output
of the educational production process.
A challenge in uncovering peer effects at school is the nonrandom group-
ing of students. Students with similar backgrounds or characteristics tend to
associate with each other, and peer groups tend to be self-selected.2 For our re-
search question, if there are unobserved characteristics of schools and students
that are correlated with both gender composition in the classroom and individ-
ual students’ outcomes, the estimation of gender peer effects would be biased.
To deal with the identification problem, researchers exploit cross-cohort varia-
tion (Hoxby 2000; Gould, Lavy and Daniele Paserman 2009; Carrell, Fullerton
2Manski (1993) documents three types of effects that can generate similar peer outcomes:
(1) correlated effects arise when individuals with similar backgrounds self-select into the
same group; (2) exogenous effects arise when individuals’ predetermined characteristics
affect their peers’ outcomes; and (3) endogenous effects arise when individuals’ outcomes
directly affect their peers’ outcomes. Since we are interested in the effects of gender, which is
fixed, the endogenous effects are not applicable here. The focus of our identification strategy
is to separate the exogenous effects from the correlated effects.
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and West 2009; Lavy and Schlosser 2011; Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2013),
or use random assignment (Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003; Carrell, Fuller-
ton and West 2009; Kremer, Duflo and Dupas 2011; ?; Shue 2013). We rely
on unique information on classroom assignments, obtained from the survey
questionnaire, and focus on middle schools in which students are randomly
assigned to classrooms. Individuals in our refined sample cannot self-select
into classrooms, and those assigned to the same classroom stay together for
learning and extracurricular activities throughout the three years of middle
school.
We use the China Education Panel Survey 2014 (CEPS 2014), a nationally
representative survey of middle-school students and teachers, to estimate how
the proportion of female classmates affects students’ academic and noncogni-
tive outcomes. We restrict our sample to schools that randomly place students
in classrooms, and conduct balancing tests of students’ predetermined charac-
teristics to verify the identification assumption. In the regression analysis, we
further control for school fixed effects to remove any school-level factors that
influence students’ achievements. The main outcome variables include stu-
dents’ test scores, which are obtained from school administrators, and noncog-
42
nitive outcomes, which are obtained from the student survey. The noncogni-
tive outcomes measure students’ mental stress, social acclimation and general
satisfaction at school, and disciplinary problems.
The results suggest that having higher proportion of female peers in the
class positively affects students’ academic and noncognitive outcomes. Specif-
ically, a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of female classmates
raises student test scores by 4.77% of a standard deviation. The presence of
more female peers also improves the average student’s mental status, social
acclimation and adaptation in school, and reduces the probability that he/she
misbehaves. In addition, the results suggest that the positive effects on test
scores are mostly driven by boys, while the effects on noncognitive outcomes
are observed for boys and girls.
We further explore the potential mechanisms through which having more
female peers in the class improves test scores and noncognitive outcomes.
We find support for the channel through improved classroom environment,
student-teacher interactions, and teachers’ job satisfaction. When there are
more female students in the class, students feel that the environment is friendlier
and more satisfying; they receive more feedbacks and more praises from teach-
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ers, and teachers report a higher level of job satisfaction. These changes as-
sociated with gender composition may be attributed to the observed benefits
in students’ learning and behavioral outcomes. However, the results do not
support the hypothesis about ability-based spillover from female students. In-
stead, it is the subjects where girls have the lowest advantage that we identify
the greatest positive gender peer effects.
This study complements and extends existing work on gender composition
in schools. First, we add new evidence on the positive effects of the pres-
ence of having more female peers on students’ academic achievements. Earlier
studies on gender peer effects mainly compare outcomes from single-sex and
co-educational schools, and the results are mixed: some studies suggest that
single-sex schools might be beneficial, while others suggest there is no differ-
ence.3 It is difficult to interpret these findings, since most of the studies cannot
isolate the causal effect of peers on student performance.
More recent studies on gender peer effects use experimental or quasi-
experimental strategies to deal with potential endogenous sorting and self-
selection. Hoxby (2000) uses the idiosyncratic variation in adjacent cohorts
3See Morse (1998) and Harwarth, DeBra and Maline (1997) for reviews of earlier studies
on gender peer effects.
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in the same schools to examine gender and race peer effects in public elemen-
tary schools in Texas. Lavy and Schlosser (2011) exploit variations in gender
composition at the school-grade level, and explore the gender peer effects and
mechanisms in elementary, middle, and high schools in Israel. Black, Devereux
and Salvanes (2013) exploit the idiosyncratic variation in cohort composition
in middle schools in Norway to examine the effects of peer composition. Lu
and Anderson (2015) experimentally vary the gender of peers sitting nearby
in a secondary school in China. Most of these studies find positive effects of
having more female peers on students’ academic outcomes (Hoxby 2000; Lavy
and Schlosser 2011; Lu and Anderson 2015).
We contribute to the literature by using a national sample of middle schools
and focusing on random student assignment. Doing so allows us to gain a
more representative and general perspective and at the same time address
the endogenous grouping problem. Previous studies that have used national
surveys typically lack the information on how students are assigned to classes
(Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer 1995; Dee 2005; Jepsen 2005), and studies
that use experimental designs usually can only focus on one school or district,
and thus have limited generalizability.
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Second, this study complements the existing work by documenting the
gender peer effects on noncognitive outcomes. Individual students’ noncogni-
tive outcomes could explain their academic achievements and long-run labor
market success and well-beings. Lavy and Schlosser (2011), the closest to this
study, also examine noncognitive outcomes, such as violence and disruptive be-
havior, but their focus is on students’ perceptions and general feelings about
the classroom environment. Our focus here is on on individual-level mental
health, social acclimation, and misbehavior.
Third, our results contribute to the understanding of peer effects in the
educational production function. In this literature, the definition of peers
varies by context, including peer cohorts within the same school (Angrist and
Lang 2004; Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2005; Ammermueller and Pischke 2009;
Gould, Lavy and Daniele Paserman 2009), roommates in college dorms (Sacer-
dote 2001; Zimmerman 2003) and peer groups in military academies (Carrell,
Fullerton and West 2009; Lyle 2007). Peer effects have been found in several
dimensions. Along the ability dimension, previous studies have found that
peers’ abilities have positive effects on student achievement (see, e.g., Sacer-
dote 2001; Zimmerman 2003; Ammermueller and Pischke 2009). Along the
46
race and social background dimension, Angrist and Lang (2004) evaluate ef-
fect of the Metco Program, which sent minority students to schools in aﬄuent
suburbs of Boston; and they find modest and short-lived peer effects. Gould,
Lavy and Daniele Paserman (2009) show that the overall presence of immi-
grants in a grade adversely affect students’ academic achievement. This study
focuses on peers in the classroom and our findings have implications for the
benefits of co-educational schooling and the optimal grouping of students.
2.2 Data and Variables
The empirical analysis draws on data from the 2014 China Education Panel
Survey (CEPS), a nationally representative survey conducted by the China
National Survey and Research Center. The CEPS is the first and largest na-
tionally representative educational survey in China, including 19,487 students
in 438 classes in 112 middle schools. The survey applies a stratified sampling
design such that four middle schools and four classrooms within each school
are chosen to represent a given county or city district. The final merged data
set includes questionnaire information from students, their parents, teachers
and schools principals.
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The measure of peer gender is the proportion of female peers in the same
class. Typically, in middle schools in China, students are assigned to classes
at the beginning of the 7th grade and take the same courses throughout their
three years in middle school. During a regular school day, students remain
in the same classroom all day and teachers come to deliver lectures in each
subject. In addition of taking courses together, students in the same class also
participate in a variety of exercises and activities together, such as self-study
sessions, sports events, and field trips. As a result, students in the same class
have intensive interactions with academic and non-academic purposes.
Student outcome variables include academic performance and noncognitive
outcomes. Students’ academic performance is measured by their exam scores
in the core courses, which are provided by the school administration offices.
We focus on the core courses because these subjects—Chinese, mathematics
and English—are the main components in the standards tests for admission
into senior high schools, and are mandatory for all middle schools. Within a
school, teachers teaching the same course use an identical syllabus and give
the same exams during a common testing period. Exams are graded in a
rigorous and consistent manner. During the grading process, each student’s
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name, class, and ID are hidden from the graders. Within a grade in the same
school, teachers divide the grading work so that the same question is typically
graded by the same teacher with a consistent standard. Test scores in the core
courses are therefore a consistent measure of academic achievement across
students in the same grade in the same school. We supplement the test scores
with students’ self-assessment academic performance scores. In the survey,
students are asked to report to what extent they have difficulties in learning
each subject, with a scale of 1 (have lots of difficulties in learning) to 4 (have
no difficulties in learning). To facilitate interpretation, we normalize the test
scores and self-assessment scores within the subject, grade, and school to have
a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.4
Measures of noncognitive outcomes are obtained from students’ responses
to 10 survey items. Four questions are related to students’ mental stress, and
in particular, ask whether during the previous seven days the students felt
(1) depressed, (2) blue, (3) unhappy, and (4) that life is meaningless. Four
questions ask about students’ social acclimation and general satisfaction at
school, in particular, (5) whether they feel that school life is boring, (6) whether
4To facilitate interpretation, we reverse the scale of the self-assessment score in question-
naire, so that 1 is the lowest score and 4 is the highest.
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they feel confident about their future, (7) how often they go to museums, zoos
or science parks with classmates, and (8) how often they go to movies, plays
or sporting events with classmates. Finally, two questions ask about students’
misbehavior, in particular, (9) how often they are late for class, and (10) how
often they skip class.5 To facilitate interpretation, we normalize each outcome
variable so that it has a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of our main variables—students’
academic and noncognitive outcomes, own and peers’ gender, and students’
basic demographics. Students’ raw test scores (un-normalized) have a mean of
81.209, and their self-assessment scores (reported on a scale of 1 to 4) have a
mean of 2.472. Both objective and subjective scores of academic performance
have large standard deviations, suggesting wide dispersion among students.
Students’ own and peers’ gender show that about 48% of the students in the
sample are female and, not surprisingly, this is the average proportion of female
5For items (1) to (4), respondents are asked to report the frequency of incidents on a
scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always). For items (5), (6), (10), and (11), they were asked to
rate how much they agree with the statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4
(strongly agree). For items (7) and (8), they were asked to rate how much they agree with
the statement on scale from 1 (never) to 6 (always).
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peers a given student has.
[Insert Table 2.1 here]
We also present students’ predetermined characteristics for the purpose of a
balance test and further control in the main specification. These variables
are Age, Minority (1 if a student belongs to a minority ethnicity group and
0 otherwise), Local Residence (1 if a student is from the local area and 0
otherwise), Only Child (1 if a student is the only child in the family and 0
otherwise), Attend Kindergarten (1 if a student attended kindergarten and 0
otherwise), Repeat in Primary School (1 if a student repeated a grade in the
primary school), Mother Education (mother’s years of schooling), and Father
Education (father’s years of schooling).
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Estimation Specification
To investigate how peers’ gender composition affects students’ cognitive and
noncognitive development, we implement the linear-in-means model, which has
been widely adopted in the literature (e.g., Sacerdote 2001; Guryan, Kroft and
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Notowidigdo 2009; Lu and Anderson 2015). We use the following regression
model:
Yics = α + β1Peerfem−ics + β2Femaleics + φX ′ics + τg + λs + εics, (1)
where Yics are the outcome measures for student i in class c in school s;
Peerfem−ics captures the proportion of female students in student i’s class
excluding student i; Femaleics is an indicator for whether the student i is
female; and εics is the error term. We cluster the standard errors at the class
level, accounting for correlation in outcomes for students in the same class.
The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the gender peer effects on
academic outcomes and noncognitive skills. The unbiased estimation requires
that conditional on all the controls in the equation, our regressor of interest
Peerfem−ics is uncorrelated with the error term εics. A possible threat to the
identifying assumption is that students may select into classes by unobserv-
ables; hence, β1 may reflect the sorting of students with certain characteristics
rather than the gender peer effect.
To address this identification concern, we focus on schools in the data
set that randomly assign students to classes, similar to the strategies used in
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Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Carrell, Fullerton and West (2009), ?
and Shue (2013). We describe the institutional background of class assign-
ment and present validity checks on random assignment in the following two
subsections. With students randomly assigned to classes, β1 is an unbiased
estimator of the gender peer effects. Furthermore, as random class assignment
is conducted within schools and school choices may not be random, we include
school fixed effects λs in the regressions, controlling for all school-level factors
that may influence the students’ school choice decisions. We also include grade
fixed effects τg to account for differences between different grades. In addition
to the baseline estimates, we further present results that control for students’
predetermined characteristics Xics (i.e., values determined before the class as-
signment), which can improve the balance between classes and our estimation
efficiency.
2.3.2 Class Assignment and Estimation Sample
Our key research question concerns the gender peer effects on student out-
comes. It is therefore critical to understand how students are assigned to
classrooms and how classmates interact. In China, middle school students are
assigned to classes at the beginning of 7th grade. Once assigned, students in
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the same class typically remain together throughout the three years of study.
They take the same subjects and are lectured by the same teachers. In ad-
dition to studying together, students attend and compete in extracurricular
events—sport, arts and social activities—representing their class. Therefore,
classmates tend to interact closely and intensively, and influence each other in
the learning and social dimensions.
The way students are matched to classrooms and therefore varying peer
composition is critical to our estimation of gender peer effects. Middle schools
in China adopt different strategies to assign students to classes. In some
schools, prior to beginning their first academic year, students take placement
exams and their scores are used to assign them to classes. Other schools sort
students by residential status, and students are placed in classes for local res-
idents or migrants. These types of assignments are nonrandom and therefore
may bias our estimation of gender peer effects.
More recently, a large and increasing number of schools have employed
random assignment rules to place students in classes. This approach is heavily
promoted by the Ministry of Education to ensure equal and fair opportunity
for all students during compulsory education (up to the 9th grade). Typically,
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randomization of students into classes is conducted by a computer program,
which can also account for balance between classrooms in terms of class size,
the proportion of migrants and other important features. Some schools also
try to balance the composition of student ability, and therefore use students’
scores and rankings in a placement exam as the balancing factor when running
the randomization program. Another commonly observed approach, especially
when enrollment is small, is to invite parents to draw lots to determine which
classes their children will join. Once student assignments are completed, teach-
ers also draw lots to determine which classes they will teach and manage.
We use principal and teacher responses in the survey to identify schools
that randomly assign their students. Such identification was challenging for
previous studies, because assignment information is usually missing in other
national-wide surveys (e.g., Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer 1995; Dee 2005;
Jepsen 2005). We consider that a school conducts random assignment if its
procedure meets all the following conditions: (1) the school principal reports
that students are randomly assigned to classes; (2) after students are assigned
to classes at the beginning of their 7th grade, the school does not rearrange
their classes for grades 8 and 9; and (3) all the head teachers in the same
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grade report that students in their grade are not assigned by test scores.6 In
the 2014 CEPS data, 59.8% of the schools use random assignment by our
criteria, resulting in an estimation sample of 8,988 students in 208 classes in
67 schools. Each student in our sample is therefore randomly placed before
enrollment and stays in the same classroom throughout his or her three years of
study. It ensures that there is no self-selection of students to classes or certain
peers, and particularly, that students assignment is random with respect to
gender composition in the classroom.
2.3.3 Verifying Random Class Assignment
To verify that students are randomly assigned to classes in our regression sam-
ple, we follow the standard methods and conduct balancing tests of students’
characteristics in the baseline, i.e., variables determined before the class as-
signment. We use the baseline specification (1) to check whether students’
predetermined characteristics—age, ethnicity, residential status, whether they
6The criteria are based on reports in the principal and teacher questionnaire. For the
first condition, all school principals are asked to report, in a multiple choice question, which
assignment rule they adopted to place students: (a) based on pre-enrollment test scores,
(b) based on students’ residential status, (c) random assignment, or (d) based on other
factors. We restrict our sample to schools that use assignment method (c). Second, the
same principals are asked whether their schools rearrange classes for grades 8 and 9, and we
rule out those that report “yes”. Last, each head teacher was asked whether students in his
or her grade are assigned by test scores, and we drop the whole grade if any head teacher
in the grade reported “yes”.
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have any siblings, kindergarten and primary school background, and parents’
education—are balanced across groups with different percentages of female
peers. If class assignment is indeed random, students having different propor-
tions of female peers in their classes should be similar in these observed charac-
teristics. As shown in Table 2.2, all the estimated coefficients of Peerfem−ics
are statistically insignificant, except for Mother Education. The magnitudes
of all the coefficients are small relative to the sample mean. For example, the
coefficient for mother’s education is 1.290, suggesting that an one-standard-
deviation increase in Peerfem−ics (0.085) is associated with an increase of
0.085 × 1.290 = 0.110 years of schooling for a student’s mother, which is
only about 1 percent of the sample mean. These results suggest that students
with different percentages of female peers are overall balanced in their baseline
characteristics.
[Insert Table 2.2 here]
In checking the balance of students’ own gender, we follow the approach used
by Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) to account for potential bias caused
by sampling peers without replacement. Specifically, as a student cannot be
assigned to herself, sampling of peers is done without replacement. In our
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setting, one direct consequence is that the peers for a female students are
chosen from a group with fewer female than the peers for a male student in
the same class. Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) suggest a solution
by additionally controlling for the mean of the sampling pool, that is, the
proportion of all female peers in the same grade in the same school excluding
student i. The estimation equation is
Femaleics = α + pi1Peerfem−ics + pi2Peerfem−igs + γgs + εics, (2)
where Peerfem−igs measures the proportion of female peers in the same grade
in the same school excluding student i; and γgs is the school-grade fixed effects.
The estimation results are reported in the last row of Table 2. We find that the
coefficient of Peerfemics is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
This result lends further support to our identification assumption that students
were randomly assigned to classes in a school.
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2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Gender Peer Effects on Academic Performance
Table 2.3 reports the estimated gender peer effects on students’ academic out-
comes, measured by test scores and self-assessment performance. We pooled
three subjects (Chinese, math and English) together and include subject fixed
effects, school fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. To facilitate interpreta-
tion, all the variables are normalized by school, grade and subject to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. We report the results without
controlling for student predetermined variables in the odd columns, and those
with these controls in the even columns.
[Insert Table 2.3 here]
Columns (1)-(2) and columns (3)-(4) report the effects of the proportion of
female peers on students’ test scores and self-assessment scores, respectively.
The results show that when students have a higher proportion of female peers
in the class, they achieve higher test scores. Interestingly, the gender peer
effects on students’ self-assessment performance are small and statistically in-
significant. These findings imply that having more female classmates improves
59
academic performance but does not significantly increase the students’ confi-
dence, as measured by self-assessment.
To appreciate the economic significance of the effect on test scores, we
use the more conservative estimate in column (2), which controls for student
characteristics. The coefficient suggests that a 10 percentage point increase
in the proportion of female classmates raises a student’s test score by 4.77%
of a standard deviation. The magnitude of the effect is comparable to the
estimates in previous studies. For instance, Lavy and Schlosser (2011) show
that in Isreal elementary and middle schools, a 20 percentage point increase in
the share of female students raises 8th graders’ by 6 to 8 percent of a standard
deviation. Lu and Anderson (2015) find that in a Chinese middle school, being
surrounded by five females rather than five males improves a female student’s
test scores by 0.20.3 standard deviations.
2.4.2 Gender Peer Effects on Noncognitive Outcomes
To examine the gender peer effects on students’ noncognitive outcomes, we
focus on 10 items in the student questionnaire that relate to their mental
stress, social acclimation and general satisfaction at school, and disciplinary
problems. All outcome variables are normalized to have a mean of zero and
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a standard deviation of one. By definition, lower scores in mental status
and disciplinary problems and higher scores in social acclimation and general
satisfaction point to improved noncognitive outcomes. For each group, we
first report the effects on the outcomes themselves (for example, whether the
student felt despressed in the previous seven days). Then, following Kling,
Liebman and Katz (2007), we present the average effect sizes (AES) to assess
the overall effects on each category (for example, the average effect across
various measures of mental stress).7
Table 2.4, panel A, presents the estimated effects on students’ mental
health. The estimated AES in column (1) is negative and significant, sug-
gesting that, overall, having a higher proportion of female peers in the class
reduces a student’s mental stress. Columns (2)-(5) report the effects on four
aspects of mental conditions separately. All the coefficients are negative, con-
sistent with the overall pattern, despite that the effects on the likelihood of
feeling depressed or blue are imprecisely estimated. Controlling for student-
7Specifically, we define the average effect size (AES) of the proportion of female peers on
category c as AES = 1nc
∑nc
n=1 ekc/σkc, where nc is the number of outcomes in category c,
ekc is the estimated effect for outcome k of category c, and σkc is the standard deviation of
the outcome variables.
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level characteristics in columns (7)-(10) yields results of similar pattern.
[Insert Table 2.4 here]
Table 2.4, panel B, reports the outcomes on social acclimation and general
satisfaction at school. Overall, we find a positive effect from having more
female classmates on students’ outcomes along this dimension. The effects on
the four individual measures of social acclimation and general satisfaction at
school are all positive and statistically significant, except for the likelihood to
engage in public enrichment with their classmates.
Last, Table 2.4, panel C, reports the estimated effects on students’ disci-
plinary problems. The estimated AES is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that having more female classmates helps to reduce disciplinary
problems. Columns (2) and (3) further show that having more female class-
mates significantly reduces the chances that students are late for school or
skip classes. All the effects remain negative and significant after controlling
for student-level characteristics.
Overall, the abovementioned results provide consistent evidence that hav-
ing a higher proportion of female peers in the class significantly improves
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students’ mental status and social acclimation, and reduces the probability
that they misbehave.
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
We conduct two sets of robustness checks in this section: more flexible speci-
fications that allow for nonlinear effects of peer gender, and the test of sample
attrition.
Nonlinear effects. Our baseline estimation specification applies a linear-in-
means model, capturing the linear effects of the proportion of female peers.
Here, we consider the possibility that the effects of female peers could be
nonlinear as in the works by Hoxby (2000), Lavy and Schlosser (2011) and
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2013). Specifically, we modify specification (1)
by including dummy variables for four categories of female ratio: (1) 20% to
40%, (2) 40% to 60%, (3) 60% to 80%, and (4) 80% to 100%. The omitted
category is a dummy variable indicating the proportion of female peer below
20%. The results, as shown in Appendix Table A2.1, show some extent of
nonlinearity and there appears to be a general upward trend in most of the
coefficients of the proportion of females. In particular, several estimates (such
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as self-assessed score, sociability measurements, and late for school) suggest
that the gain from having more female peers is mostly driven by the presence
or absence of a very high proportion of female peer. This finding is in line
with Hoxby (2000) in which the impacts are highest when female students are
a majority of the class, and Lavy and Schlosser (2011) in which the impacts
are highest when the proportion of females exceeds 58%.
Placebo test. Another concern is that since students are randomly assigned
to classrooms, and the standard deviation of gender composition in class is
small, which results in a small variation in our regression interest. In our
estimation sample, the mean value of female peer is 0.49 and the standard
deviation is 0.85. To deal with this concern, we conduct a placebo test that
examine the effect of gender peer on three outcomes which are assumed should
not be affected by gender peer, including student’s height, weight and whether
has a myopia. As shown in Appendix Table A2.2,as expected, all the estimated
coefficients are economically small and statistically insignificant.
Sample attrition. One concern on sample attrition is that, our estimates of
gender peer effects may be biased if peer’s gender affects the likelihood of miss-
ing values in students’ outcome variables. For example, having more female
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peers may make some students less willing to report disciplinary problems. To
address this concern, we generate a attrition dummy indicating missing values
for each outcome of interest, then regress the attrition dummy on peer gender,
student gender, and school and grade fixed effects. As shown in Appendix
Table A2.3, the coefficients on peer gender (proportion of female peer) are all
closed to zero and not statistically significant, implying that our results are
unlikely to be driven by sample attrition.
2.5 Mechanisms
The aforementioned estimates show positive effects of female peers in the class-
room on students’ academic performance and noncognitive outcomes. In this
section, we explore the potential channels through which having more female
peers benefits a student. In particular, we focus on four potential channels:
positive spillover from female peers, improved classroom environment, better
teacher-student interactions, and improved teachers’ job satisfaction.
2.5.1 Female Students Spillovers
It has been well recognized and documented that girls outperform boys in mid-
dle schools, especially in subjects such as reading and language, and in behav-
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ior (Dee 2007; Bertrand and Pan 2013). Hence, when more female students—
who are likely to be high-achieving in academic tests—are present in class,
other students could benefit from a positive spillover. In other words, female
students on average exhibit higher ability, and the effects of having more fe-
male students in the classroom stem from the spillovers from those high-ability
students.
We argue that if the gender peer effects are primarily driven by spillover
from high-achieving female students, then the effect is likely to concentrate on
subjects and areas where girls have greater advantage over boys. We examine
the three core subjects separately to exploit the variation in female advatange.
As shown in Table 2.5, the coefficients of Female Student suggest that girls’
advantage is larger in Chinese and English and much smaller in math. This
is consistent with the evidence in the literature in that compare with math
and science, girls have comparative advantage in reading and language (Dee
2007; Fryer and Levitt 2010). However, the coefficients of Proportion female
peer—our estimates of the gender peer effects—reveal that having more female
peers yields greatest benefits on a student’s math test scores, and small and
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statistically insignificant effects on Chinese test scores.
[Insert Table 2.5 here]
The contrast direction of the gender gap and gender peer effects does not sup-
port the spillover hypothesis. Indeed, similar contrast has been documented in
exisiting studies. For instance, Hoxby (2000) show that although girls and boys
perform equally well in math, the presence of more female peers increases the
math scores of both female and male students. Lavy and Schlosser (2011) find
positive effects from having more female peers in subjects that girls achieve
lower scores than boys. So we claim that the spillover channel is unlikely to
explain the positive effects of having more female students in the class.
2.5.2 Classroom Environment
A second possible mechanism is that female students make the classroom
environment friendlier and more satisfying, leading to better academic and
noncognitive behavioral outcomes for all students. To investigate this possi-
ble channel, we use the following two items: (1) “I feel that my classmates
are friendly to me.” and (2) “I feel that our classroom has a satisfying atmo-
sphere.” The students are asked to rate to what extent they agree with the
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statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). We
normalize the responses with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
to fit regression equation (1).
The results, as shown in Table 2.6, support the hypothesis. We observe
that when more female students are present in the class, on average, students
feel learning environment friendlier and the atmosphere more satisfying. The
effects are statistically significant. It is possible that the improved classroom
environment may make learning more enjoyable and efficient, thus benefit stu-
dents’ achievement on tests. Friendlier environment can also facilitate students
social interaction so that they are well-adjusted among school peers. Overall,
we find evidence supporting the channel that more female students in the class
is associated with a better learning environment for the students.
[Insert Table 2.6 here]
2.5.3 Teacher-Student Interaction
The third mechanism we examine is the interaction between students and their
teachers. The gender composition in the classroom may influence teachers’ be-
havior toward students and therefore students’ learning outcomes. To assess
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the relevance of this channel, we use four items in the student questionnaire
that describe their interaction with teachers: (1) “the head teacher always
praises me;”(2) “the head teacher always criticizes me;”(3) “the subject teach-
ers always ask me to answer questions in class;”and (4) “The subject teachers
always praise me in class.”The students are asked to rate to what extent they
agree with the statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly
agree), and we normalize the responses with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one.
Table 2.7 reports the estimation results, which support improved teacher-
student interactions when more female students are present in class. Results
show that when there is a higher proportion of female peers in the class, a
student is likely to receive more praise and less criticism from the head teacher;
he or she is also more likely to be questioned in class and receive praise from
subject teachers. Overall, these results show that there is more proactive and
positive interaction between the teacher and students when there are more
female students in the classroom, lending support to the machanism through
better teacher-student interaction.
[Insert Table 2.7 here]
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2.5.4 Teacher’s Job Satisfaction
Last, we analyze whether more female students in the class affects teachers’
work satisfaction and evaluation of the classroom environment. Teacher-level
factors may influence their motivation and the way they teach and manage the
class. To this end, we focus on three items from the teachers’ questionnaire:
(1) “I’m satisfied with being a teacher;”(2) “I feel that the school atmosphere
is good;”and (3) “The students in class respect me.”The teachers are asked to
rate to what extent they agree with the statements on a scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), and we normalize the responses with a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Table 2.8 report the estimation results, revealing that teachers feel more
satisfied with the job and consider the classroom environment better when
more female students are present in the class. Although the effects are not
statistically significant, the positive association is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that gender composition in the class influence teachers’ assessment and
possibly their teaching behavior.
[Insert Table 2.8 here]
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Overall, the findings around possible mechanisms suggest that the positive
effects of having more female peers in the class are not entirely generated
by the spillover from girls’ better performance. Instead, we find evidence
that female students improves the classroom environment, inter-students and
teacher-student relationships, and teachers’ job satisfaction. The evidence
is in line with Lavy and Schlosser (2011), who focus on the Israel national
education data and find that an increased proportion of female peers reduces
the level of disciplinary problems, improves inter-students and teacher-student
relationships, and reduces teachers’ fatigue.
Unfolding the mechanisms is important for policy design. To the extent
that the number of female students in a school is fixed, the benefit from having
more female peers in a class could be offset by the cost of having fewer female
peers in another class. The source of the peer effects provides more practical
and low-cost opportunities to improve student outcomes. For example, teach-
ers can exert more effort in facilitating student interactions and providing more
feedback if there are fewer female students than desired. The assignment of
teachers to classes can also take into account the gender composition: teachers
who interact more with students might compensate for the lower proportion
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of female students in the classroom.
2.6 Gender Differences in Gender Peer Effects
In this section, we explore how female and male students are affected by peers’
gender in different ways. Table 2.9 reports the gender peer effects on test scores
and self-assessment scores for boys and girls, respectively. As for test scores,
we find small and insignificant impact of peers’ gender on girls but large and
significant effects on boys. On average, a 10 percentage point increase in the
proportion of female classmates is associated with a 0.7% standard deviation
increase in girls’ test scores but a 9.6% increase in boys’ test scores. The differ-
ence between the coefficients is statistically significant. Neither boys’ or girls’
self-assessment scores appear to be responsive to the share of female peers.
The coefficients for each gender group are small and statistically insignificant,
and the difference between the effects on girls versus boys is also insignificant.
[Insert Table 2.9 here]
Table 2.10 reports the heterogeneous effects on noncognitive skills by student
gender. The benefit of more female peers on reducing mental stress is more
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pronounced among girls than boys, while the benefit of reducing disciplinary
problems is stronger for boys. It is possible that girls and boys differ in the
sensitivity of their emotion and behavior to environments. Girls’ mental status
might be more sensitive to their surroundings and peers than boys, while boys’
behavior are more likely to be corrected by environmental influences. The
effects on social acclimation and satisfaction are similar, with slightly larger
magnitudes for boys.
[Insert Table 2.10 here]
2.7 Conclusion
This paper uses a nationally representative survey of middle school students
to investigate gender peer effects on students’ academic performance and vari-
ous noncognitive outcomes. Utilizing information about classroom assignment
within schools, we are able to restrict the sample to schools that randomly
assign students in classrooms and therefore estimate the causal relationship
between peers’ gender and student outcomes.
The results show that having a higher proportion of female peers in the
class significantly raises students’ test scores, reduces their mental stress, im-
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proves social acclimation and general satisfaction at school, and mitigates dis-
ciplinary problems. Exploring the potential mechanisms through which peers’
gender plays a role, we find evidence of improved classroom environment,
inter-students and teacher-student interactions, and teachers’ level of job sat-
isfaction.
The findings have several contributions and policy implications. First,
while most of the literature focuses on the effects of the school environment
on students’ academic outcomes, our study provides more evidence on the
impact on students’ noncognitive and behavioral outcomes, which have been
documented as important factors in explaining academic achievement, labor
market success, and other significant life outcomes (Heckman and Rubinstein
2001; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev 2013; Segal 2013; Bertrand and Pan 2013).
Second, understanding the mechanisms behind gender peer effects provides
relatively low-cost methods for educational policy design to improve students’
test scores and noncognitive outcomes. For example, to compensate for the
small share of female students in certain classes, schools could allocate more
experienced and patient teachers to classes, or provide orientations and class
activities to facilitate students’ cooperation and interactions.
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Chapter 3:
The Effect of Environmental Regulation
on Firms’ Innovation
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the effect of environmental regulation on firms’ innova-
tion, exploiting a policy that imposed stricter environmental regulations in
designated cities in China. In recent decades, the governments adopted tight-
ening environmental regulations to address growing concerns over environmen-
tal deterioration, and policy makers often hold conflicting views about whether
environmental regulation can foster innovation. From the traditional perspec-
tive, tightening environmental regulation is seen as a burden on economic
activities, such as firm performance, R&D expenditures, sales, and profits
(Iraldo, Testa, Melis and Frey 2011). However, the Porter hypothesis, formu-
lated by Professor Michael Porter of Harvard Business School in Porter (1991)
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and Porter and Van der Linde (1995), argues that strict environmental regula-
tion can instead foster innovation. That is, the environmental regulations add
additional constraints on firms’ profit-maximizing decisions, and to maximize
profits subject to the new constricts, firms will do a variety of things differ-
ently, such as investing more on new technology or more efficient equipments.
As a result, those new different activities will result in more innovations.
The challenge in empirically testing the Porter hypothesis is the causal in-
ference, since an experiment that randomly impose strict environmental reg-
ulations on firms would be impractical. In this paper, we study the effect of
environmental regulation on firms’ innovation, exploiting a change in environ-
mental policy that mandates stricter environmental regulations in designated
cities in China. To measure innovation, we exploit a unique dataset that con-
tains detailed information on each patent application in China from 1994 to
2009. This includes the patent’s application date and full name (with a brief
description of its purpose and use), and the applicants’ (firms’ or individuals’)
names and detailed addresses. Exploiting the postal code in the applicant’s
address, we aggregate each patent application into city-year level, and con-
struct our outcome variable — the number of the firm’s patent applications in
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each city from 1994 to 2009.
To identify the effect of environmental regulation, we exploit the TCZ
policy, which was implemented by the Chinese government in 1998 in 175
designated cities out of a total of 380 Chinese cities in the country, and conduct
a difference-in-difference (DID) estimation. The first difference comes from
comparison of patent applications in TCZ and non-TCZ cities, and the second
difference comes from time periods: pre-treatment (before 1998) and post-
treatment (during and after 1998). We compare how the number of patent
applications changes in the designated cities after the TCZ reform relative to
changes in non-designated cities.
We have several findings. First, the DID estimation shows that firms in
cities with tougher environmental regulations have more innovations; this con-
firms the weak version of the Porter hypothesis, which claims that strict envi-
ronmental regulation can foster innovation. Second, our annual treatment es-
timates indicate that the coefficients on the interaction between TCZ and year
dummies continue to increase and become substantially large in mid 2000s–
around six to eight years after the policy’s implementation. This lagged effect
suggests the difficult “learning by doing” process for innovation, which is con-
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sistent with the pattern found in the United States (Moser and Voena 2012).
Finally, to shed light on the mechanism, we find evidence in support of the
within-firm improvements in innovation, fixed asset investment, and profits (in-
tensive margin) and firms’ increased startup and closure activities (extensive
margin). We also find that firms tend to produce more environmentally-related
inventions in response to stricter regulations.
This paper mainly contributes on the large strand of literature that exam-
ines the Porter hypothesis.1 The first contribution is to carefully addressing the
causal inference in environmental regulation. Considerable studies empirically
examine the correlations between environmental regulations and innovation,
with mixed results (See for example, Jaffe and Palmer 1997; Brunnermeier and
Cohen 2003; Hamamoto 2006; Lanoie, Patry and Lajeunesse 2008; Franco and
Marin 2015; Rubashkina, Galeotti and Verdolini 2015.)2. One major concern
in the literature is that the endogeneity in environmental regulations may con-
taminate the estimates. Most of the previous studies exploit panel datasets to
1In particular, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) characterize two variants of the Porter Hypoth-
esis: the weak version claims that tighter environmental policies may stimulate innovation,
and the strong version claims that environmental policy may lead to higher overall produc-
tivity of firms. This paper focuses on the weak version.
2Another strand of literature in porter hypothesis is from a theoretical perspective. See
for example Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999); Ambec and Barla (2002); Mohr (2002);
Greaker (2006); Andre´, Gonza´lez and Porteiro (2009).
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address this concern. For example, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) uses industry-level
panel data for the U.S. manufacturing sector, and find a positive relationship
between pollution-abatement costs and total R&D expenses. Brunnermeier
and Cohen (2003) employs panel dataset and find that increases in pollution-
abatement expenditures improve US manufacturing industries’ environmental
innovation, as measured by the number of successful environmental patent
applications. Yang, Tseng and Chen (2012) exploits an industry-level panel
dataset for the 1997-2003 period in Taiwan, and find that stronger environmen-
tal protection induces more innovation. In this paper, by exploiting a policy
reform in environmental regulation and using a unique and detailed patent
dataset, we are able to adopt a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to
study the causal effect of environmental regulation on innovation.
Our second contribution is to uncover the mechanisms by which stricter
environmental regulation plays a role in firms’ innovation activities. Whether
the increased innovation is resulted from the improved within-firm’s technol-
ogy and investment, or from the replacements of firms in the market? While
the evidence for different channels is scarce in literature, we make several
steps to investigate the channels. First, exploiting a keyword search in the
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patent dataset (details will be discussed in Section 6.1), we find positive ef-
fects of environmental regulation on both overall and environmentally related
innovations, and a much larger magnitude of coefficient on the environmentally
related products. This provides evidence for the argument in Jaffe and Palmer
(1997) that firms specifically produce environmental innovations to reduce the
pollution in response to environmental regulation.3 Second, we find evidence
that the TCZ cities experienced more dramatic levels of firm startups and
closures between 1995 and 2004, which indicates the possibility that stricter
environmental regulation increases firms’ innovation in city level by introduc-
ing more efficient firms and forcing out less efficient firms. Third, we restrict
our estimation to a subsample of firms that were established before 1998 (year
from which the regulation implemented) and continued until 2009, and find a
within firm’s improvement in innovation, fixed asset investments, and profit
(intensive margin). This provides suggestive evidence that firms respond the
stricter regulation by investigating and replacing technology and equipments.
Third, while most of the empirical research regarding the Porter hypothesis
3While most previous studies focus on overall innovation, there is limited empirical evi-
dence focus on environmentally related innovation. To our knowledge, the only exception is
Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), who find evidence that there is a significant and positive
relationship between pollution abatement expenditures and environmental patents in US
manufacturing industries from 1983 through 1992.
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focus on developed economies, such as the US (Jaffe and Palmer 1997; Brun-
nermeier and Cohen 2003), European countries (Franco and Marin 2015), and
Japan (Hamamoto 2006), our study is one of the first to examine the effect
of environmental regulation on innovation in developing countries. Investigat-
ing whether the Porter hypothesis applies in developing countries has great
importance. On the one hand, it helps to understand the source of the sub-
stantial increase in the number of patent applications in developing economies
in recent years. On the other, the governments in developing countries have
begun to impose a series of strict regulations in response to severe air pollution
in the past decades, and understanding the economic consequences of strict
environmental regulations has great policy implications.
More broadly, our study is also related to the large stand of literature that
examines the effect of environmental regulation on various economic outcomes.
Economic outcomes include, for example, housing price (Chay, Dobkin and
Greenstone 2003), school absence (Currie et al. 2009); infant mortality (Chay
and Greenstone 2003; Greenstone and Hanna 2014); labor supply (Hanna and
Oliva 2015); firm’s location decision and formation (Becker and Henderson
2000; List et al. 2003); employment (Greenstone 2002); foreign direct invest-
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ment inflow and outflow (Keller and Levinson 2002; Eskeland and Harrison
2003; Cai, Chen and Gong 2016), and firms’ export activity (Hering and Pon-
cet 2014).
In addition, our study also contributes to the literature that examines a
long-standing question: the determinants of innovation. Previous studies have
documented the important role played by various factors such as competition
(Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt 2005; Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers 2001), employment density (Carlino, Chatterjee and Hunt 2007),
human capital input (Simonen and McCann 2008), compulsory licensing and
patent law (Moser and Voena 2012; Duggan, Garthwaite and Goyal 2016). For
example, Carlino, Chatterjee and Hunt (2007) find a positive and significant
relationship between patent intensity and employment density in highly ur-
banized portions of metropolitan areas. Simonen and McCann (2008) show
that human capital inputs acquired from other regions can be an important
determinant for innovation. Moser and Voena (2012) find compulsory licensing
increases domestic invention by 20 percent. Given the fact that there is a sub-
stantially growing number of environmental regulations in past decades over
the world, it will have great importance to examine whether the increasing
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environmental regulations could explain the increasing patent application.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the back-
ground of the TCZ policy. Section 3.3 describes the data and variable. Section
3.4 describes the estimation framework. Section 3.5 presents empirical find-
ings, with a number of robustness checks. Section 3.6 discusses mechanisms,
and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background: The Two Control Zones Policy
In January 1998, the Chinese state council approved the establishment of
two control zones (TCZ): sulfur dioxide pollution control zones and acid rain
control zones. the State Council’s official document provides the name list of
the cities designated as TCZs. The list was created in January 1998 and was
unchanged from 1998 to 2009 (See Appendix Table 1 for the complete list for
TCZ cities). Among a total of 380 cities in China, 175 were designated as
TCZ cities. Once a city had been designated as a TCZ city, stricter regulatory
policies were implemented. The main goal of the TCZ policy was to reduce
SO2 emissions and acid rain in the TCZ regions.
Selection Criteria—Of a total of 380 prefecture cities, 175 were des-
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ignated as TCZ cities. Specifically, the prefectures were designated as SO2
pollution-control zones if:
• Average annual ambient SO2 concentrations exceeded 20 g/m3.
• Daily average concentrations of SO2 exceeded 60 g/m3.
• High SO2 emissions had been recorded.
Alternatively, prefectures were designated as acid-rain control zones if:
• Average annual PH values for precipitation was less than or equal to 4.5.
• Sulfate deposition was greater than the critical load.
• High SO2 emissions had been recorded.
Geographical Distribution—The TCZ-designated status was reported in
the Official Reply to the State Council Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas
and Sulfur Dioxide Pollution Control Areas, published by the State Council
in 1998. Figure 3.1 shows the geographic distribution of TCZ cities in China.
The green-shaded prefectures represent SO2 control Zones, and the red-shaded
prefectures represent acid-rain control zones. Several features of the distribu-
tion of TCZ cities across the country are notable: First, TCZ cities accounted
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for 11.4% of the nation’s territory, 40.6% of the population, 62.4% of GDP, and
58.9% of total SO2 emissions in 1995 (Hao, Wang, Liu, and He 2001). Second,
SO2 pollution-control zones were typically located in northern China whereas
acid-rain control zones were typically located in southern China. A possible
explanation is that provinces in northern China relied on thermal energy for
heating, while the climate is relatively more humid in southern China.
[Insert Figure 3.1 here]
Enforcement and Effectiveness—Once a city has been designated a
TCZ city, tougher regulatory policies were implemented. For example:
• Construction of new collieries based on coal with a sulfur content of 3%
or above was prohibited.
• Newly constructed or renovated coal-burning thermal power plants that
use coal with a sulfur content of 1.5% or above were required to install
sulfur scrubbers.
• Existing power plants that use this high-sulfur coal were required to
adopt SO2 emission-reduction measures.
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• In polluting industries, the production technologies and equipment that
generate severe air pollution were not allowed.
• Local governments were required to collect emission fees from major
sulfur emitters.
Rich evidence has documented the policy’s effectiveness in reducing acid rain
and air pollution in TCZs (He, Huo and Zhang 2002). First, among the 175
TCZ cities, the number of cities that met the standard for national ambient-air
SO2 concentration increased from 81 in 1997 to 98 in 1999. Second, by the
end of 1999, collieries that produced more than 50 million tons of high-sulfur
coal had been shut down, and by May 2001, 4492 high-sulfur coal mines in
the TCZ area had ceased production (Hering and Poncet 2014). Third, by
2000 SO2 emissions in the TCZ cities had fallen by about 3 million tons, while
around 71% of factories with initial emissions of more than 100 tons per year
had their SO2 emissions to the standard (Tanaka 2015).
3.3 Data and Variables
Our dataset comes from multiple sources: (1) the State Intellectual Prop-
erty Office (SIPO), 1994-2009, for information of patent applications; (2) the
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Chinese City Statistical Yearbook, 1994-2009, for information on city demo-
graphic characteristics; (3) the Chinese patent database for listed firms, for
information on within-firm innovation (intensive margin), and (4) the 1995
and 2004 Economic Censuses, for information on firm closures and new entries
(extensive margin).
The primary data source is the Chinese patent dataset from SIPO, which
includes rich and detailed information on each patent application in China
from 1985.4 Information includes the patent’s application date, full title (with
a brief description of the its purpose and use), official name (firms’ or individu-
als’), their detailed addresses including the corresponding postal code, and the
patent’s type (ie., whether the patent application is for an invention patent, a
utility model patent, or a design patent.).
Our key outcome variable is the number of firms’ patent applications in
each city in each year, from 1994 to 2009. We construct the city-level outcome
variable by focusing on firm’s patent application and aggregating the appli-
cation record at the city-year level (Yct). Since some cities have zero patent
application records, we use the log transformation as ln(Yct + 1).
4We use the dataset from 1994 to 2009 since the information of city’s postal code is
incomplete for the years before 1994.
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The second data source is the Chinese City Statistical Yearbook from 1994
to 2009. From this dataset, we collect city-year control variables (Xct) and
city pre-determined characteristics (Zc) such as geographical features, polit-
ical status, population, non-agriculture population, GDP growth rate, and
average wage. Table 3.1 lists the summary statistics for the number of patent
application and city pre-determined demographical characteristics for TCZ
and non-TCZ cities.
[Insert Table 3.1 here]
The third dataset we exploit is the Chinese patent database for listed firms,
which includes more than 190,000 patent applications from the firms listed on
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We use this dataset to examine
the mechanism from intensive margin. Combined with the Chinese listed firm
basic information dataset, we restrict our estimation sample to a subsample of
listed firms that established before 1998 and remained in the market until 2009,
and exploit this firm-level dataset to examine within-firm (intensive margin)
mechanisms.
The fourth data source we exploit is the 1995 and 2004 Economic Censuses
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from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This dataset contains basic
information, including name, address, and business activities for all manufac-
turing firms in China in 1995 and 2004. We exploit this dataset to measure
the effect of TCZ policy on firm new entry and closure activities (extensive
margin mechanism).
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Validity of Identification Assumption
One main concern is the difference in pre-existing trend in innovation between
TCZ cities and non-TCZ cities. To examine the pre-trend, Figure 3.2 shows
the time trend of the conditional average number of firm’s patent application
in TCZ cities and Non-TCZ cities from 1994 to 2009. Specifically, follow-
ing Gentzkow (2006), we first regress the city level outcome variable (logged
number of firms’ innovation) on the full set of city-year level controls, with
city fixed effects, and then calculate the average residuals in each year, for
TCZ and non-TCZ cities respectively. As shown in Figure 3.2, there are two
notable findings: First, the pre-trend of patent application are parallel across
TCZ and non-TCZ cities before 1998. Second, as shown in the figure, from the
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designation of TCZ cities in 1998, the TCZ cities immediately shows a notable
increase of patent innovation, and it is the first time that the conditional mean
of the patent application in TCZ cities is almost the same as that in non-TCZ
cities in 1999.
In addition, we further conduct a robustness check to verify the parallel
trend. Specifically, we regress the outcome variable on a linear time trend,
TCZ dummy variable, the interactions between the linear time trend and TCZ
dummy, and the city demographic controls. The interaction term could be
interpreted as the difference between TCZ and non-TCZ cities in the pre-
trend. As expected, we find insignificant and small coefficients, suggesting
that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two groups has parallel
pre-trend.
[Insert Figure 3.2 here]
3.4.2 Empirical Specification
To identify the effect of TCZ on firm’s innovation, we exploit a difference-
in-difference (DID) approach. Specifically, there are two group of cities, the
treatment group includes the cities that were designated as TCZ cities in 1998,
and the control group includes the cities that were not designated as TCZ
90
cities in 1998. We compare the difference of firms’ patent application in TCZ
cities before and after 1998, with the difference of firms patent innovation in
non-TCZ cities before and after 1998.
The baseline specification is as following:
Yct = α + βTCZc × Postt +X ′ctγ + ηc + λt + ct (1)
where Yct is the number of firms’ patent application (log) in city c in year t.
TCZc is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if city c was designated
as TCZ city in 1998, and 0 otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable that equals
to one for years in or after 1998, and 0 otherwise. ηc is the city fixed effect,
which captures all city level time-invariant characteristics; λt is the year fixed
effect, which captures year-specific shocks that are common across cities. Xct is
a set of city-year level additional controls, including GDP, growth rate of GDP,
population, population intensity, and the level of average wage. We cluster the
standard error ct by city-year level, allowing for potential correlations within
cities over time.
The estimator of interests is β, which captures the effect of environmental
regulation on firms’ innovation, from 1994 to 2009. If the Porter hypothesis
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exists in China, β is expected to be positive and significant, that is: the tougher
environmental regulation foster firms’ innovation.
Furthermore, although the figure provides graphic evidence in support of
the similar conditional pre-trend across TCZ and non-TCZ cities, it may not
be fully convinced that TCZ and non-TCZ cities would have similar post-
trend without the regulation. In particular, as shown in Table 3.1, we do find
evidence that there are many significant pre-existing difference between TCZ
and non-TCZ cities. For example, TCZ cities generally have more population
and higher political status. A potential concern is that such existing differences
might generate differential patterns over time after the regulation across TCZ
and non-TCZ cities. To address this concern, we additionally control for a set
of city pre-determined demographics including its pre-determined political,
geographical and economics status in specific linear trend in the specification
as following:
Yct = α + βTCZc × Postt +X ′ctγ + ηc + λt + Z ′c × t+ ct (2)
where the Z ′c × t effectively controls for the trend of patent application
generated by the pre-determined city demographics in a linear time trend. In
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the main result, we provide results based on the above two specifications. In
addition, in robustness check part, we further conduct a battery of tests to
show the results are not spurious.
3.5 Empirical Findings
3.5.1 Effect of Environmental Regulation on Innovation
Our empirical strategy compares the changes in patent applications across
treatment groups (TCZ cities, with strict environmental regulations) and con-
trol groups (non-TCZ cities). The dependent variable is the total number of
firms’ patent application (log) per city and year.
Table 3.2 reports the effect of TCZ policy on firm’s patent application.
The estimates are consistent with figure 3.2, showing that implementation of
the TCZ policy has a positive and significant effect on firms’ patent innova-
tion. Using the most conservative estimates in column (3), on average, TCZ
regulation improves firms’ innovation in TCZ cities by around 10.5% more
than in non-TCZ cities. The positive and significant estimates confirm the
weak version of Porter hypothesis which argues that environmental regulation
places additional constraints on firms profit-maximizing decisions and encour-
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ages firms to innovate more as a response (Porter 1991; Porter and Van der
Linde 1995).
The magnitude of our estimates is comparable to findings in the literature.
For example, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) examine the relationship between envi-
ronmental expenditures and innovation in a panel of manufacturing industries
in the US, and find that within-industry elasticity of R&D with respect to
lagged pollution-control expenditure is about 0.15. Kneller and Manderson
(2012) uses data from the UK’s manufacturing industry from 2000 to 2006,
and find that a £100 increase in operating expenditures for pollution abate-
ment raises environmental R&D by between £5 and £6. Albrizio, Koz´luk
and Zipperer (2014) investigate the impact of changes in environmental policy
stringency on firms’ productivity growth in OECD countries, and find that
the average change in productivity is around 0.12.
[Insert Table 3.2 here]
3.5.2 Annual Treatment Effect
In addition to the average effect, we further estimate the annual treatment ef-
fect to examine the timing of changes in patent innovation. The premise is that
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if in response to strict environmental regulation, firms increase their inventions
through experience and learning by doing, the most substantial change should
be observed several years delay of time after the policy is implemented.
Specifically, consistent with specification (2), we exploit the following spec-
ification to examine the annual treatment effect:
Yct = α + βtTCZc × Y earpostt +X ′ctγ + ηc + λt + Z ′c × t+ ct (3)
where βt measures the differential change in patent applications between TCZ
cities and non-TCZ cities in year t after TCZ policy implementation in 1998.
As reported in Table 3.3, while the coefficients remain positive through out
the full time period, it is noteworthy that they became consistently large and
significant beginning in mid 2000s, suggesting that the TCZ effect need around
six to eight years to be materialized.
This result is consistent with historical factors and previous studies of
patented invention in the US. In particular, Moser and Voena (2012) examine
the effect of compulsory licensing on patented invention in the US, and find
that the full effects of licensing become evident after six to nine years and
remain. This common observed lag effect in different countries may be the
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result of difficult learning process for innovation, and suggests the importance
of human capital accumulation in technology transitions.
[Insert Table 3.3 here]
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we conduct a battery of robustness checks.
3.5.3.1 Falsification Test
First, we conduct a falsification placebo test by exploiting the false assignment
of TCZ status to cities. As a similar practice conducted by Chetty, Looney
and Kroft (2009), we randomly assign TCZ status to cities and construct a
false treatment variable—TCZfalsec × Postt . We then regress our baseline
specification with the false treatment variable, and store the estimates. We
repeat this exercise 500 times. Because of the false assignment, if no significant
omitted variables exists, we should not observe any significant estimates. The
empirical density of the estimated coefficients on TCZfalsec ×Postt are reported
in Figure 3.3, and as expected, the distribution of estimated coefficients on the
placebo test is centered around zero and our true estimate is the outlier in the
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test. This result suggests that our estimates are not biased due to any omitted
variables.
[Insert Figure 3.3 here]
3.5.3.2 Expectation Effect
Another potential concern is the expectation effect of the TCZ policy. In
particular, China’s National Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) began
to compile a list of TCZ cities in late 1995, and took around two years to get
approval from the State Council. As a result, the real effect of TCZ policy
might have occurred before the year of effectiveness (1998). To address this
concern, we include an additional control: an indicator variable that indicates
implementation of TCZ policy in the following year in the specification. If
there is an expectation effect, we should expect to find significant differences
between TCZ-cities and non-TCZ cities before the policy implementation. In
other words, the interaction term between TCZ and next-year implementation
should be significant if an expectation effect exists. Results are reported in
column 1 in Table 3.4; the estimate of the interaction term between TCZ
and next year is negative and insignificant, and our main estimates of interest
remain almost unchanged.
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3.5.3.3 Alternative Measurement of Innovation
In the main result, we measure firms’ innovation by including the number of
patents applied for by the firms. A potential concern is that a small proportion
of firms’ patent might be applied for by the firm’s representative, instead of
the firm. As a result, in the patent dataset, the applicant’s name is likely to be
recorded as an individual’s name, even when the patent is actually belongs to
the firm.5 As a robustness check, we use the total number of patent application,
both those applied for by firms and individuals—as the measure of innovation.
As shown in column 2 of Table 3.4, the estimates are similar.
3.5.3.4 Exclusion of Special Cities
In column 3 of Table 3.4, we exclude three type of cities which typically re-
ceive more administrative preferences and beneficial policies, including four
municipalities, the provincial capital cities, and the special economics zones.
The results are almost unchanged.
3.5.3.5 Estimates by Patents’ Type
The Chinese patent system grants three types of patent filing, namely, inven-
tion, utility model and design pattern. Invention patents refer to new technical
5potential reasons include reduction in the application fee and tax avoidance.
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solutions or improvements to a product or a process with practical applica-
bility. Utility model refers to new technical improvements on the existing
products. Design pattern refers to the innovations in the external features of a
product, such as products shape, pattern, and color. Typically, the standard
for acquiring a patent of innovation is the highest while the standard for ac-
quiring a patent of design pattern is the lowest, since the design pattern has
small and incremental requirements for innovation.
Because of the small innovation requirement for design patent, it would
raise some concerns if the positive effects are mostly driven by the design
patent. To address this concern, we estimate the heterogeneous effect by
patent’s type. Column 4 to column 6 in Table 3.4 rules out this concern:
it suggests that the effect of environmental regulation is largest on invention
patent, and the positive estimates are mostly driven by the invention and
utility model patent.
[Insert Table 3.4 here]
Taken together, the above robustness checks provide evidence that our
results are not spurious.
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3.6 Mechanism
We have established that firms in TCZ cities filed more patent applications
after the policy was implemented than firms in non-TCZ cities. In this sec-
tion, we investigate the potential mechanisms through which the environmen-
tal regulations operated, which received scarce attention in the literature. We
propose three potential hypotheses: 1) The regulation increased firms’ envi-
ronmentally related invention to reduce the pollution and energy usage. 2)
The regulation increased firm’s replacements, measured by new entry and clo-
sure activities. 3) The regulation increased within-firm innovation, resulted
from firm’s re-engineering and technology improvements. We next examine
these three channels separately.
3.6.1 The Effect of TCZ on Environmentally Related
Patents
First of all, firms are expected to innovate more efficient products, with less
pollution or energy usage, in response to the stricter regulations, and this ar-
gument is also suggested by Porter (1991).6 If this channel holds, we should
6Specifically, Porter (1991) argues “Strict product regulations can also prod companies
into innovating to produce less polluting or more resource-efficient products that will be
highly valued internationally. As a result of the U.S. proposed phaseout of chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs), for example, Du Pont and other American firms are pioneers in finding
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expect environmental regulations to significantly increase environmentally re-
lated innovations. Due to the lack of comfortable dataset, a few studies di-
rectly test this hypothesis by focusing on environmental innovations, and to
our knowledge, the only exception is Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003).7
To test this channel, we specifically focus on the environmental-related
patents. In particular, we define the environmentally related patent by search-
ing the key words in the patent dataset. Since our dataset contains the rich
information for each patent, such as its purpose and use, we first manually
read the information for 500 randomly selected items of patent application for
each year, and record the environmentally related key words that appeared in
the 500×16 = 8, 000 items. To this end, we find 15 key words that are related
to the environment and pollution, such as “solar energy”, “environmental pro-
tection”, and “power saving”. We then apply these 15 key words to the whole
dataset, and calculate the number of environmentally related patent for each
city in each year. (See Appendix Table 3.2 for the full list of keywords).
As shown in Table 3.5, positive and significant estimates indicate that
stricter environmental regulation substantially fosters firms’ innovation in en-
substitutes.”
7Specifically, they find the increase in pollution abatement expenditures improves envi-
ronmental innovation in US manufacturing industries from 1983 to 1992.
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vironmentally related products. Compared to the main results in Table 3.2,
we notice that the magnitude of the coefficients on environmentally related
patent applications is much larger than that on overall patent applications.
This result provides evidence that stricter environmental regulation specifi-
cally increases firms incentive to specifically innovate “less polluting and more
resource-efficient” products.
[Insert Table 3.5 here]
3.6.2 Extensive Margins: Firms’ New Entries and Clo-
sures
Another potential mechanism is firms’ increased replacements. Specifically,
low efficient firms are likely to close down because of the additional financial
burden caused by the stricter regulations. Furthermore, to reach the new envi-
ronmental standard, local governments are likely to close down high-polluting
firms and introduce more high-tech firms which are more likely to produce in-
novations. These government activities are supported by the evidence of Cai,
Chen and Gong (2016), who find that provincial governments in China respond
to the pollution-reduction mandates by shifting their enforcement efforts away
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from the most downstream county.
In our setting, if such a channel exists, we should observe that TCZ cities
experience more dramatic replacement activities of firms. We exploit the Eco-
nomic Census data which covers all manufacturing firms in 1995 and 2004 in
China and examine whether TCZ cities experience more firm’s start up and
close down in the period. The results in Table 3.6 confirm this hypothesis: we
observe that after controlling for all city characteristics, TCZ cities have sig-
nificantly more firm closure and more new entry activities from 1995 to 2004
than non-TCZ cities.
[Insert Table 3.6 here]
3.6.3 Intensive Margins: Within-Firm Improvement
As suggested in Porter (1991), another important channel is that firms replace
their equipments and improve technology to meet the new standards intro-
duced by the policy, and as a result produce more inventions. 8 The premise
here is that if firms improve innovation by re-engineering or introducing more
efficient equipments, we should observe an increase in within-firm innovation,
8Specifically, Porter (1991) argues: “But everything will not stay the same. Properly
constructed regulatory standards, which aim at outcomes and not methods, will encourage
companies to re-engineer their technology. The result in many cases is a process that not
only pollutes less but lowers costs or improves quality.”
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as well as other firm’s performance such as fixed asset investment, ongoing
projects and profit.
To shed light on this channel, we use the Chinese patent database for
listed firms, which includes more than 190,000 published patent applications
for companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.9 By
combining the dataset with each firm’s basic information dataset, we further
restrict the estimation sample to listed firms that began before 1998 and re-
mained in the same city until 2009. To this end, estimates should capture the
intensive margin of the TCZ policy.
The results are reported in Table 3.7. In column 1, we include the whole
sample, which includes all listed firms. In column 2, we adopt the restricted
sample, which includes firms that started before 1988 and remaind until 2009
only. The positive and significant estimate in column 2 suggests a within-firm
improvements in innovation. In addition, we examine the effect of environ-
mental regulation on firm’s other performance including total asset, fixed asset
investment, ongoing projects and net profits. As shown in column 3 to column
9In the main estimation, we use the patent dataset that covers patent applications from
all firms in China from 1994 to 2009. In this subsection, we use the dataset for listed firms
to examine the intensive margin mechanism, since there is no available dataset that covers
basic information annually for all firms in China.
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6, we find the regulation substantially improve firms’ asset investment, ongoing
project and net profit. This pattern provides suggestive evidence that firms
respond to the stricter regulation by doing a variety of things differently such
as within’s re-engineering and investment activities, and such new activities
might result in the increase in within firm’s innovation.
[Insert Table 3.7 here]
To summarize, we find evidence in support of the mechanism from both
extensive and intensive margins. That is, on the one hand, stricter environ-
mental regulation increases firms’ replacements, measured by new entry and
closure activities. On the other, stricter environmental regulation increases
within-firm innovation. We find suggestive evidence that the increased within-
firm innovation is resulted from re-engineering equipments and technology. In
addition, we also find evidence that firms specifically produce more environ-
mentally related innovations to reduce pollution.
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3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we exploit the Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy, using a unique
dataset that contains detailed information on each patent application in China
from 1994 to 2009, to examine the effect of environmental regulation on firms’
innovation. Our difference-in-difference estimation suggests that stricter en-
vironmental regulation increases firm’s innovation, which is measured by the
number of patent applications.
This result confirms the weak version of the Porter hypothesis, which argues
that strict environmental regulation can foster firm’s innovation. Our annual
treatment estimates indicate a lagged effect on patent applications, suggest-
ing a difficult learning process for innovation, and the importance of human
capital accumulation in technology transitions. Regarding the mechanism by
which stricter environmental regulation play roles, we find evidence in support
of both extensive margin and intensive margin. Specifically, we observe that
firms in TCZ cities experience more dramatic level of new entry and closure
activities. Focusing on a sub-sample of firms that started before the policy
reform and remained in the market till 2009, we observe there is a within-firm
improvements in innovation, fixed assets investment and net profits. In addi-
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tion, we find evidence that firms specifically increase environmentally related
patent in response to the regulation. These channels we documented confirm
the corresponding arguments in the Porter hypothesis (Porter 1991).
This study mainly makes contributions to the large strand of literature on
Porter hypothesis. First, it examines the effect of environmental regulation on
innovation by carefully addressing the endogeneity problem in environmental
regulation. Second, it provides evidence for different channels, which have
received scarce attention in previous studies. Finally, to our knowledge, this




Tables and Figures for Chapter 1
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics
Panel A. Outcome Variables
Mean Standard Deviation Observation
Academic Outcomes: (1) (2) (3)
Test Score 81.26 28.34 25783
Self-Assessment Score 2.48 0.91 26301
Noncognitive Outcomes:
Depressed 2.24 1.00 8772
Blue 1.98 1.06 8743
Unhappy 2.28 1.05 8762
Pessimistic 1.75 1.07 8734
School Life is Fulfilling 3.38 0.86 8852
Confident about Future 3.26 0.72 8924
Social Activities: Public Enrichment 2.02 1.04 8686
Social Activities: Private Recreation 2.44 1.28 8653
Panel B. Regressors of Interest
Female Student 0.49 0.50 8910
Female Head Teacher 0.65 0.48 8988
Female Subject Teacher 0.78 0.41 19550
Panel C. Student Pre-Determined Variables
Age 13.94 1.35 8815
Minority 0.11 0.31 8968
Local Residence 0.80 0.40 8811
Only Child 0.51 0.50 8986
Attend Kindergarten 0.82 0.39 8912
Repeat in Primary School 0.11 0.32 8988
Academic Ranking in Primary School 15.65 11.82 8121
Mother’s Education 10.07 3.63 8966
Father’s Education 10.73 3.28 8966
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Table 1.2. Balancing Test
Notes: Column (1) and column (2) present the mean and standard deviation of the student predetermined variables. Column
(3) and column (4) present the difference and standard error. Specifically, in column (3) and column (4), each cell represents
a separate regression, in which the independent variable is an indicator for female head teacher, and the dependent variable
is the corresponding student, classroom and teacher characteristic as listed above. All specifications in column (4) include








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Student Characteristics
Female 0.50 0.47 0.029** 0.020
[0.09] [0.1] (0.013) (0.014)
Age 13.87 14.16 -0.292* -0.195
[1.14] [1.22] (0.173) (0.199)
Minority 0.07 0.15 -0.082*** -0.007
[0.12] [0.28] (0.028) (0.007)
Local Residence 0.77 0.83 -0.060** -0.004
[0.2] [0.21] (0.030) (0.022)
Only Child 0.56 0.39 0.171*** 0.027
[0.25] [0.31] (0.040) (0.017)
Attend Kindergarten 0.84 0.77 0.066*** 0.012
[0.11] [0.16] (0.019) (0.014)
Repeat in Primary School 0.09 0.17 -0.077*** -0.007
[0.13] [0.17] (0.021) (0.011)
Academic Ranking in Primary School 14.67 15.96 -1.293** -0.394
[3.64] [4.04] (0.560) (0.538)
Mother’s Education 10.49 9.23 1.261*** 0.103
[2.04] [2.58] (0.331) (0.130)
Father’s Education 10.96 10.08 0.882*** 0.199
[2.02] [2.03] (0.301) (0.123)
Panel B. Classroom and Teacher Characteristics
Proportion Other Female Subject Teachers 0.81 0.77 0.033 -0.078
[0.28] [0.31] (0.044) (0.049)
Chinese Teacher’s Teaching Experience 16.52 16.43 0.094 -0.829
[8.77] [9.58] (1.524) (2.062)
Math Teacher’s Teaching Experience 17.05 16.66 0.389 -0.965
[9.26] [9.39] (1.710) (2.356)
English Teacher’s Teaching Experience 15.12 14.21 0.909 -1.636
[9.34] [9.3] (1.565) (1.952)
Class Size 41.39 47.04 -5.655*** -0.115
[12.32] [15.93] (2.016) (1.321)
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Table 1.3. Teacher Gender Effect on Students’Academic Outcomes
Notes: Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school, to obtain a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one. Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school,
mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in
family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. ***significant at the 1%
level, **5% level, *10% level.
Test Score Self-Assessment Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Teacher × Female Student 0.141** 0.144*** 0.269*** 0.273***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052)
Female Teacher -0.035 -0.040 -0.115*** -0.117***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032)
Female Student 0.316*** 0.194*** -0.011 -0.062
(0.051) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
Subject Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No Yes No Yes
Observations 16,355 16,355 16,733 16,733
R-squared 0.053 0.256 0.015 0.060
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Table 1.4A. Teacher Gender Effect on Noncognitive Outcomes - Mental Stress
Depressed Blue Unhappy Pessimistic AES Depressed Blue Unhappy Pessimistic AES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
-0.155*** -0.168*** -0.135*** -0.036 -0.123*** -0.158*** -0.174*** -0.138*** -0.038 -0.127***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.052) (0.049) (0.044) (0.053) (0.055) (0.052) (0.048) (0.043)
Female Teacher -0.029 -0.035 -0.043 -0.072 -0.009 -0.012 -0.023 -0.054
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)
Female Student 0.253*** 0.069 0.128*** -0.046 0.277*** 0.092* 0.157*** -0.014
(0.044) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.039)
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288
R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.042 0.033 0.044 0.046 0.042 0.033
Notes: Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating
minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at
class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 1.4B. Teacher Gender Effect on Noncognitive Outcomes - Social Acclimation and Satisfaction
Notes: Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local
residence, only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.069 0.107* 0.032 0.139*** 0.087*** 0.075 0.113** 0.035 0.137*** 0.091***
(0.052) (0.057) (0.044) (0.047) (0.031) (0.050) (0.055) (0.043) (0.047) (0.030)
Female Teacher 0.087 0.058 0.090* -0.005 0.066 0.027 0.064 -0.016
(0.055) (0.050) (0.054) (0.044) (0.052) (0.044) (0.048) (0.042)
Female Student 0.029 -0.105** 0.002 -0.092** 0.003 -0.163*** -0.027 -0.108***
(0.043) (0.050) (0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.048) (0.035) (0.039)
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141
R-squared 0.070 0.067 0.196 0.211 0.083 0.110 0.222 0.229
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Table 1.4C. Teacher Gender Effect on Noncognitive Outcomes, Controlling for Test Score
Mental Stress Social Acclimation and Satisfaction
Depressed Blue Unhappy Pessimistic AES Fulfillingof Life
Confident
abt Future






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
-0.158*** -0.173*** -0.138*** -0.036 -0.126*** 0.072 0.109** 0.036 0.139*** 0.089***
(0.053) (0.055) (0.052) (0.048) -0.043 (0.050) (0.055) (0.043) (0.046) (0.030)
Female Teacher -0.007 -0.008 -0.023 -0.049 0.025 -0.016 0.078* -0.001
(0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.049) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042)
Female Student 0.281*** 0.105** 0.158*** 0.001 -0.028 -0.195*** -0.017 -0.097**
(0.044) (0.047) (0.043) (0.039) (0.042) (0.048) (0.035) (0.039)
Average Test Score -0.016 -0.047*** -0.004 -0.055*** 0.101*** 0.122*** -0.023 -0.041***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,288 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141 7,141
R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.042 0.033 0.089 0.120 0.222 0.230 0.089
Notes: Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority,
local residence, only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Average Test score is the normalized student’s
average test score in three core subjects. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 1.5. Mechanism: Is it Due to Teacher Gender or Other Teacher Characteristics?



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.121** 0.276*** -0.165*** -0.209*** -0.160*** -0.021 -0.140*** 0.106* 0.091 0.018 0.136** 0.089***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.051) (0.046) (0.054) (0.057) (0.048) (0.053) (0.033)
Subject Fixed Yes Yes NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female Student ×
Teacher Control
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female Teacher ×
Teacher Control
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,655 16,023 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 6,930 6,930 6,930 6,930 6,930
R-squared 0.258 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.050 0.089 0.114 0.229 0.235
Notes: Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child
in family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Teacher control includes: teacher’s age, education, teaching experience, working experience as head
teacher (for head teacher only) and dummy variables indicating married, has a certificated credential, graduated from normal college, and teach a main subject (for head teacher only). Standard
errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 1.6. Mechanism: Teachers’ Behaviors
Panel A: Head Teachers’ Behaviors
Outcome: Head Teachers’ Praises Outcome: Head Teachers’ Criticisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.062 0.066 0.062 -0.130*** -0.134*** -0.127***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)
Female Teacher 0.123** 0.099* 0.088 0.100** 0.111** 0.125***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.056) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046)
Female Student 0.044 -0.011 -0.042 -0.236*** -0.208*** -0.167***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040)
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Test Score Control No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,444 7,444 7,444
R-squared 0.095 0.128 0.138 0.051 0.060 0.075
Panel B: Subject Teachers’ Behaviors
Outcome: Subject Teachers’ Class Questionings Outcome: Subject Teachers’ Praises
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.129*** 0.126*** 0.111*** 0.100** 0.098** 0.080**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Female Teacher -0.015 -0.012 -0.007 0.016 0.017 0.022
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Female Student -0.087** -0.123*** -0.144*** -0.034 -0.077** -0.101***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Subject Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Test Score Control No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 16,273 16,273 16,273 16,275 16,275 16,275
R-squared 0.085 0.103 0.111 0.100 0.122 0.134
Notes: Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence,
only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. In panel A, test score control is the student’s average test score in three core
subjects. In panel B, test score control is the student’s test score in the corresponding subject. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level,
*10% level.
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Table 1.7. Mechanism: Students’ Responses
Panel A. Reduced Gender Stereotype Threats
Outcome: Boys are More Talented in Learning Math
(1) (2) (3)




Female Teacher 0.074 0.069 0.068
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Female Student -0.113* -0.117* -0.118*
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No Yes Yes
Test Score Control No No Yes
Observations 5,233 5,233 5,233
R-squared 0.059 0.061 0.061
Panel B. Role Model Effects
Outcome: The Subject is Useful for My Future




Female Teacher -0.072* -0.057 -0.050
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040)
Female Student -0.002 -0.040 -0.070*
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Subject Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No Yes Yes
Test Score Control No No Yes
Observations 16,296 16,296 16,296
R-squared 0.048 0.079 0.096
Notes: Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education,
father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether
attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. In panel A, test score control is the
student’s test score in math. In panel B, test score control is the student’s test score in the corresponding
subject. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.035 0.217*** 0.088* 0.421*** 0.098* 0.296***
(0.068) (0.065) (0.051) (0.155) (0.054) (0.096)
Female Teacher 0.023 -0.075 -0.004 -0.210** -0.004 -0.154**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.037) (0.094) (0.039) (0.061)
Female Student 0.213*** 0.185*** 0.245*** -0.001 0.240*** 0.052
(0.063) (0.059) (0.047) (0.114) (0.050) (0.091)
Subject Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,938 9,417 14,795 1,560 13,343 3,012
R-squared 0.285 0.247 0.269 0.245 0.263 0.252
Notes: Test score is normalized by subject and school grade. In our estimation sample, the medium of mother’s
education is 9 years. Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education,
father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attended
kindergarten and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant
at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 1.9. Heterogeneous Effects: Noncognitive Outcomes
Panel A. Mental Stress
Depressed Blue Unhappy Pessimistic AES Depressed Blue Unhappy Pessimistic AES
Mother’s Education > 9 years Mother’s Education <=9 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
-0.108 -0.129 -0.105 0.004 -0.082 -0.154** -0.175** -0.128** -0.029 -0.126**
(0.083) (0.082) (0.086) (0.065) (0.066) (0.069) (0.071) (0.064) (0.063) (0.053)
Observations 3,136 3,132 3,133 3,133 3,122 4,426 4,409 4,419 4,397 4,372
R-squared 0.062 0.068 0.061 0.072 0.069 0.065 0.060 0.049
Ethnic Majority Ethnic Minority
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
-0.122** -0.147*** -0.101* 0.018 -0.088** -0.161 -0.228 -0.284* -0.402** -0.279**
(0.052) (0.056) (0.053) (0.052) (0.044) (0.173) (0.214) (0.170) (0.155) (0.135)
Observations 6,775 6,756 6,768 6,753 6,722 787 785 784 777 772
R-squared 0.054 0.055 0.053 0.049 0.143 0.143 0.119 0.088
Living with Parents Parents Migrated Out
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
-0.127** -0.138** -0.096* -0.007 -0.093* -0.213 -0.255* -0.248** -0.153 -0.223**
(0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.055) (0.048) (0.130) (0.132) (0.115) (0.109) (0.094)
Observations 6,130 6,111 6,120 6,107 6,076 1,432 1,430 1,432 1,423 1,418
R-squared 0.057 0.060 0.052 0.047 0.097 0.106 0.101 0.084
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Table 1.9. Heterogeneous Effects: Noncognitive Outcomes (Continued)




















Mother’s Education>9 years Mother’s Education<=9 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.149** 0.066 -0.024 0.166* 0.099* 0.064 0.098 0.055 0.119** 0.087**
(0.071) (0.069) (0.077) (0.089) (0.052) (0.064) (0.065) (0.053) (0.0481) (0.035)
Observations 3,171 3,177 3,105 3,096 3,058 4,458 4,504 4,395 4,375 4,289
R-squared 0.066 0.101 0.116 0.128 0.096 0.100 0.218 0.186
Ethnic Majority Ethnic Minority
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.139*** 0.086 0.031 0.142*** 0.102*** 0.035 0.107 -0.045 -0.078 0.016
(0.051) (0.053) (0.046) (0.049) (0.033) (0.137) (0.158) (0.130) (0.124) (0.072)
Observations 6,848 6,886 6,727 6,700 6,597 781 795 773 771 750
R-squared 0.075 0.110 0.203 0.215 0.180 0.148 0.359 0.328
Living with Parents Parents Migrated Out
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.088 0.104* 0.001 0.164*** 0.090** 0.186 0.034 0.115 0.032 0.108*
(0.054) (0.060) (0.048) (0.051) (0.036) (0.116) (0.110) (0.081) (0.094) (0.059)
Observations 6,182 6,222 6,087 6,070 5,970 1,447 1,459 1,413 1,401 1,377
R-squared 0.081 0.110 0.213 0.222 0.140 0.140 0.250 0.251
School fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local
residence, only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at
the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 2
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Standard deviation Observation
Outcome variable: Academic outcomes
Test score 81.209 28.400 26209
Self-assessment score 2.472 0.916 26746
Outcome variable: Noncognitive outcomes
Depressed 2.238 1.000 8772
Blue 1.980 1.060 8743
Unhappy 2.277 1.047 8762
Pessimistic 1.747 1.072 8734
School life is fulfilling 3.375 0.861 8852
Confident about future 3.256 0.717 8924
Social activity: Public enrichment 2.025 1.037 8686
Social activity: Private recreation 2.437 1.283 8653
Being late for school 1.246 0.618 8931
Skip class 1.091 0.427 8924
Regressors of interests
Proportion of female peer 0.487 0.085 8910
Female student 0.487 0.500 8910
Predetermined variables
Age 13.941 1.348 8815
Minority 0.110 0.313 8968
Local residence 0.804 0.397 8811
Only child 0.509 0.500 8986
Attend kindergarten 0.817 0.387 8912
Repeat in primary school 0.115 0.319 8988
Mother’s education 10.075 3.634 8966
Father’s education 10.727 3.284 8966
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Simple OLS With school
fixed effects
Age 13.941 -0.174 -0.092
(1.008) (0.092)
Minority 0.110 -0.184 -0.052
(0.305) (0.035)
Local residence 0.804 0.298 -0.005
(0.203) (0.094)
Only child 0.509 0.592** 0.117
(0.236) (0.085)




Repeat in primary school 0.115 -0.340*** -0.015
(0.130) (0.051)
Mother’s education 10.075 4.953** 1.290**
(2.252) (0.622)
Father’s education 10.727 4.197** 0.671
(1.676) (0.613)
Female 0.487 0.000* 0.010
(0.000) (0.031)
Notes:In column (1) and column (2), each cell represents a separate regression, in which the
dependent variable is the student’s predetermined variable as listed above. See section 3.2 for
detailed descriptions. Specifications in column (2) include school fixed effects and grade fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at class level and reported in parentheses. ***significant at the
1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 2.3. Gender Peer effect on Academic Outcomes
Test score Self-assessment score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion female peer 0.493** 0.477** 0.103 0.046
(0.247) (0.226) (0.161) (0.154)
Female student 0.439*** 0.414*** 0.189*** 0.174***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017)
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 25,992 24,735 26,520 25,277
R-squared 0.048 0.080 0.009 0.024
Notes: Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school, to obtain a mean
of zero and standard deviation of one. Individual controls include: student’s age, mother’s education,
father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in family,
whether attended kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at
class level and reported in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 2.4. Gender Peer Effect on Noncognitive Outcomes
Panel A: Mental stress
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AES Depressed Blue Unhappy Pessimistic AES Depressed Blue Unhappy Pessimistic
Proportion
female peer
-0.336* -0.109 -0.214 -0.535** -0.526** -0.276 -0.071 -0.113 -0.484** -0.487**
(0.194) (0.231) (0.209) (0.214) (0.219) (0.185) (0.221) (0.202) (0.207) (0.215)
Female student 0.147*** -0.043* 0.034 -0.078*** 0.155*** -0.038 0.044* -0.071***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022)
Observations 8,607 8,696 8,667 8,687 8,658 8,213 8,294 8,268 8,285 8,260
R-squared 0.046 0.049 0.046 0.036 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.042
























0.552*** 0.532** 0.604*** 0.338 0.723*** 0.495*** 0.514** 0.525*** 0.258 0.654***
(0.112) (0.217) (0.164) (0.245) (0.215) (0.110) (0.214) (0.153) (0.257) (0.230)
Female student 0.094*** -0.013 0.050** 0.021 0.086*** -0.023 0.046** 0.021
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 8,412 8,777 8,847 8,614 8,583 8,038 8,365 8,427 8,219 8,191
R-squared 0.076 0.074 0.205 0.209 0.083 0.084 0.219 0.224
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.4. Gender Peer Effect on Noncognitive Outcomes (continued)
Panel C: Disciplinary problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AES Late for school Skip class AES Late for school Skip class
Proportion female peer -0.327** -0.252 -0.387** -0.339** -0.288* -0.379**
(0.143) (0.168) (0.151) (0.149) (0.174) (0.160)
Female student -0.090*** -0.100*** -0.089*** -0.097***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observation 8,846 8,856 8,849 8,431 8,440 8,434
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.076
Notes: Individual controls include: student’s age, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence,
only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level and reported
in parentheses.***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 2.5. Mechanism: Spillover Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chinese Math English Chinese Math English
Proportion female peer 0.255 0.653** 0.571** 0.284 0.595** 0.552**
(0.262) (0.274) (0.262) (0.238) (0.260) (0.243)
Female student 0.590*** 0.163*** 0.564*** 0.570*** 0.133*** 0.538***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,665 8,664 8,663 8,246 8,245 8,244
R-squared 0.088 0.008 0.079 0.114 0.041 0.118
Notes: The dependent variable is the test score for each subject, normalized by school and grade.
Individual controls include: student’s age, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables
indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and repeated a
grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level and reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 2.6. Mechanism: Classroom Environment
(1) (2)








School fixed effects Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression with specification (1), and the
dependent variable is the outcome as listed above. Individual controls include:
student’s age, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables
indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attended
kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are
clustered at class level and reported in parentheses. ***significant at the 1%
level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 2.7. Mechanism: Teacher-Student Interaction
(1) (2)








School fixed effects Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes








Subject fixed effects Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression with specification (1),
and the dependent variable is the outcome as listed above. Individual
controls include: student’s age, mother’s education, father’s education,
and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in
family, whether attended kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary
school. Standard errors are clustered at class level and reported in
parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
128
Table 2.8. Mechanism: Teacher’s Job Satisfaction
(1) (2)












Subject fixed effects Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes
Teacher controls No Yes
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression in which the dependent
variable is the teacher level outcome as listed above, and the independent
variable is the proportion of female students in class. Teacher controls
include: subject teacher’s age, teaching experience, education, and
dummy variables indicating married, has certificate credential, and
graduated from a normal college. Standard errors are clustered at class
level and reported in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level, **5%
level, *10% level.
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Table 2.9. Gender Peer Effect on Academic Outcomes by Student Gender
Test score Self-assessment score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male Difference Female Male Difference
Proportion female peer 0.071 0.959*** -0.888** -0.097 0.079 -0.176
(0.233) (0.296) [0.001] (0.196) (0.217) [0.509]
Subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,217 12,518 12,429 12,848
R-squared 0.061 0.059 0.044 0.042
Notes:Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school, to obtain a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Individual controls include: student’s age, mother’s
education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in
family, whether attended kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary school. In column (1), (2), (4)
and (5), Standard errors are clustered at class level and reported in parentheses. In column (3) and
column (6), p-values are reported in brackets. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 2.10. Gender Peer Effect on Noncognitive Behavioral Outcomes by Student Gender
Mental stress Social acclimation and satisfaction Disciplinary Problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel A: Female















-0.586** -0.300 -0.593** -0.748** -0.711** -0.161 0.180 0.291 0.777*** -0.161 -0.161 -0.330 0.032
(0.272) (0.295) (0.291) (0.288) (0.339) (0.201) (0.192) (0.260) (0.274) (0.201) (0.201) (0.244) (0.178)
School fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 4,055 4,098 4,087 4,096 4,080 4,109 4,144 4,064 4,057 4,144 4,144 4,147 4,146
R-squared 0.078 0.073 0.083 0.059 0.083 0.108 0.239 0.254 0.088 0.071
Panel B: Male


















-0.010 0.075 0.345 -0.252 -0.221 0.581*** 0.699** 0.789*** 0.200 0.621** -0.559** -0.330 -0.860***
(0.239) (0.296) (0.279) (0.284) (0.264) (0.135) (0.272) (0.222) (0.314) (0.270) (0.219) (0.245) (0.276)
School fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 4,158 4,196 4,181 4,189 4,180 4,060 4,256 4,283 4,155 4,134 4,287 4,293 4,288
R-squared 0.044 0.054 0.043 0.043 0.097 0.085 0.213 0.215 0.095 0.098
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Table 2.10. Gender Peer Effect on Noncognitive Behavioral Outcomes by Student Gender (Continued)
Panel C: Gender difference
Mental stress Social acclimation and satisfaction Disciplinary problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)












Gender difference -0.375 -0.938** -0.496 -0.49 -0.426 -0.609** 0.091 0.156 0 0.892**
P-value [0.315] [0.015] [0.193] [0.217] [0.174] [0.027] [0.744] [0.601] [0.999] [0.012]
Notes:Individual controls include: student’s age, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attended
kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary school. In panel A and Panel B, standard errors are clustered at class level and reported in parentheses. In Panel C, p-values are reported in
brackets.***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 3
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics
Data source: 1. State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), 1994- 2009; 2. Chinese City Statistical
Yearbook, 1995.
TCZ city Non-TCZ city
Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome variable (1994-2009):
Number of firm’s Patent application (log) 4.3 1.94 2.48 1.59
Invention 2.72 1.96 1.27 1.37
Utility Model 3.39 1.87 1.71 1.48
Design 3.07 2.02 1.43 1.35
City Predetermined Characteristics (1995):
East region 0.52 0.5 0.4 0.49
Special economic zone 0.03 0.16 0 0
Provincial capital city 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.17
Municipality 0.03 0.16 0 0
Population (log) 5.56 0.93 5.06 0.97
Non-agricultural population (log) 4.35 0.88 3.76 0.82
Average Wage (log) 8.58 0.24 8.38 0.23
Self-employed worker (log) 1.57 0.92 1.07 0.99
Number of hospitals (log) 4.89 0.97 4.34 1.02
GDP Growth Rate 6.28 3.34 7.17 3.01
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Table 3.2. Main Result
Dependent Variable: Number of firm’s patent application (log)
(1) (2) (3)
TCZ* Post 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.105**
-0.05 -0.05 -0.051
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
City Controls No Yes Yes
Trend* City Pre-Characteristics No No Yes
Observations 3733 3733 3733
R-squared 0.909 0.911 0.915
Notes: Observations are in the city-year level. City controls include: GDP (log), growth rate
of GDP, population (log), population intensity, and average wage (log). City
Pre-characteristics include: the growth rate of GDP, population (log), non-agricultural
population (log), average wage (log), number of workers in private sectors (log), number of
hospitals (log), and dummy variables indicating the east region, special economic zone,
municipal, and provincial capital city in 1995. Standard errors are clustered at city-year level.
***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 3.3. Annual Treatment Effect


























City Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
City Controls Yes
Trend* City Pre-Characteristics Yes
Observation 3,733
R-squared 0.92
Notes: The table reports the coefficients for TCZ*year dummies, which
is the annual treatment effect. Observations are in the city-year level.
City controls include: GDP (logged), growth rate of GDP, population
(log), population intensity, and average wage (log). City
Pre-characteristics include: the growth rate of GDP, population (log),
non-agricultural population (log), average wage (log), number of
workers in private sectors (log), number of hospitals (log), and dummy
variables indicating the east region, special economic zone, municipal,
and provincial capital city in 1995. Standard errors are clustered at city
level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 3.4. Robustness Checks
Notes: Each column presents the estimates for each robustness check. Observations are in the city-year level. City controls include: GDP (logged), growth rate of
GDP, population (log), population intensity, and average wage (log). City Pre-characteristics include: The growth rate of GDP, population (log), non-agricultural
population (log), average wage (log), number of workers in private sectors (log), and number of hospitals (log), and dummy variables indicating the east region,
special economic zone, municipal, and provincial capital city in 1995. Standard errors are clustered at city level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10%
level.








Invention Utility model Design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TCZ* Post 0.112** 0.132*** 0.114** 0.332*** 0.209*** 0.091
(0.056) (0.030) (0.055) (0.057) (0.052) (0.066)
Next year dummy 0.031
(0.103)
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend* city Pre-characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,733 3,733 3,221 3,733 3,733 3,733
R-squared 0.915 0.950 0.880 0.888 0.906 0.852
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Table 3.5. Mechanism: Environmentally Related Innovation
Dependent variable: Number of environmentally related patent application (log)
(1) (2) (3)
TCZ* Post 0.464*** 0.431*** 0.243***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044)
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
City controls No Yes Yes
Trend* City Pre-Characteristics No No Yes
Observations 3,733 3,733 3,733
R-squared 0.786 0.790 0.826
Notes: Observations are in the city-year level. City controls include: GDP (logged),
growth rate of GDP, population (log), population intensity, and average wage (log).
City Pre-characteristics include: the growth rate of GDP, population (log),
non-agricultural population (log), average wage (log), number of workers in private
sectors (log), and number of hospitals (log), and dummy variables indicating the east
region, special economic zone, municipal, and provincial capital city in 1995.
Standard errors are clustered at city-year level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5%
level, *10% level.
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Table 3.6. Mechanism: Firms’ Closures and New Entries, 1995-2004




City Controls Yes Yes
Observations 481 481
R-squared 0.409 0.262
Notes: Observations are in the city level. The dependent variable for column (1)
is the number of firms’ closures\exits from 1995 to 2004 (log), and the
dependent variable for column (2) is the number of firms’ new entries from
1995 to 2004 (log). City controls include: GDP (logged), growth rate of GDP,
population (log), population intensity, and average wage (log). Standard errors
are clustered at city level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10%
level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TCZ* Post 0.162*** 0.166*** 0.538** 0.760** 0.63 0.623*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.25) (0.31) (0.38) (0.35)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend*City Pre-char Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15717 2836 2758 2732 2570 2406
R-squared 0.258 0.34 0.298 0.303 0.203 0.229
Notes: In column (1), the estimation is from the full sample of listed firms. In column (2) to column (6),
the estimations are restricted within a sub-sample of listed firms that started before 1998 and remained
until 2009. City controls include: GDP (logged), growth rate of GDP, population (log), population intensity,
and average wage (log). City Pre-characteristics include: the growth rate of GDP, population (log),
non-agricultural population (log), average wage (log), number of workers in private sectors (log), number of
hospitals (log), and dummy variables indicating the east region, special economic zone, municipal, and
provincial capital city in 1995. Standard errors are clustered at city-year level. ***significant at the 1% level,
**5% level, *10% level.
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Figure 3.1. Geographical Distribution of TCZ Cities
Notes: The green shaded prefectures represent SO2 Control Zone, and the red
shaded prefectures represent Acid Rain Control Zone, which are designated by the
Two Control Zone policy in 1998.







1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
TCZ cities Non-TCZ cities
Conditional Mean in Patent application (logged)
Figure 3.2. Trend in Patent Application, by TCZ and Non-TCZ Cities
Notes: The figure presents the time trends of the conditional mean in the number of patent
application (logged) in TCZ and non-TCZ cities. The vertical line in 1998 indicates the TCZ
policy in 1998, and the Y axis indicates the average number of patent application, conditional











.105-.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12
estimate
Figure 3.3. Kernel Density Distribution of Estimates
Notes: the X axis presents the estimated coefficients of “TCZ*Post” from the
500 randomized assignment exercises. The Y axis presents the kernel density
of the estimates. The vertical line (0.105) is the true estimate from
specification (2).
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Table A 1.1. Gender Difference across Classes with Female and Male Head Teachers
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression in which the dependent variable is the student pre-determined characteristic as listed above, and the independent
variable is interaction term between head teacher’s gender and student’s gender, dummy for head teacher’s gender, and dummy for student’s gender. School fixed
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.026 0.020** 0.003 -0.033 -0.009 -0.009 0.264 0.176 0.087
(0.048) (0.009) (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.605) (0.110) (0.117)
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,742 8,891 8,735 8,908 8,835 8,910 8,054 8,888 8,888
R-squared 0.398 0.513 0.222 0.303 0.094 0.187 0.091 0.406 0.364
162
Table A 1.2. Robustness Check: Female Head Teacher and Academic Outcomes
Test Score Self-Assessment Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Subject Teacher ×
Female Student
0.150*** 0.151*** 0.277*** 0.280***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Female Subject Teacher -0.040 -0.044 -0.119*** -0.121***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032)
Female Student 0.342*** 0.214*** 0.014 -0.038
(0.055) (0.054) (0.047) (0.048)
Female Head Teacher ×
Female Student
-0.053 -0.040 -0.050 -0.046
(0.047) (0.044) (0.039) (0.040)
Female Head Teacher 0.139*** 0.101** 0.086*** 0.065**
(0.050) (0.045) (0.033) (0.032)
Subject Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control No Yes No Yes
Observations 16,355 16,355 16,733 16,733
R-squared 0.054 0.257 0.015 0.060
Notes: Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school, to have a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one. Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary
school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence,
only child in family, whether attended kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Standard
errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A 1.3. Robustness Check: Alternative Measurement of Teacher Gender
Mental Stress Social Acclimation and Satisfaction








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Proportion Female Teacher
× Female Student
-0.358*** -0.322*** -0.291*** -0.013 -0.246*** 0.080 0.297*** -0.005 0.274*** 0.162***
(0.116) (0.114) (0.102) (0.090) (0.086) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.079) (0.047)
Proportion Female Teacher 0.059 -0.093 -0.010 -0.125 0.311*** 0.152 0.181 -0.139
(0.130) (0.131) (0.139) (0.120) (0.107) (0.095) (0.114) (0.087)
Female Student 0.437*** 0.232*** 0.266*** -0.006 0.009 -0.296*** 0.023 -0.198***
(0.089) (0.088) (0.078) (0.069) (0.071) (0.077) (0.073) (0.062)
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,342 4,342 4,342 4,342 4,342 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267
R-squared 0.070 0.066 0.073 0.056 0.106 0.114 0.221 0.241
Notes: “Proportion female teacher” is an alternative measurement of teacher gender, and it is the time weighted proportion of female teachers in class. Student control includes: student’s
age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attended
kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A 1.4. Robustness Check: Including Teacher Control, Grade Fixed Effect, and Student Fixed Effect
Test Score Self-Assessment Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Teacher × Female Student 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.230** 0.287*** 0.292*** 0.295***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.093) (0.051) (0.053) (0.112)
Female Teacher -0.053 -0.044 -0.086 -0.167*** -0.125*** -0.114
(0.037) (0.038) (0.055) (0.046) (0.034) (0.073)
Female Student 0.170*** 0.171*** NA -0.080* -0.077* NA
(0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046)
Subject Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Student Control Yes Yes NA Yes Yes NA
Teacher Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 15,655 15,655 15,655 16,023 16,023 16,023
R-squared 0.256 0.257 0.829 0.130 0.061 0.655
Notes: Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school. Student control includes: student’s age, academic
ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in
family, whether attend kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade in primary school. Teacher control includes: subject teacher’s age, teaching
experience, education, and dummy variables indicating married, has certificate credential, and graduated from a normal college. Standard
errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A 1.5. Robustness Check: Including Teacher Control and Grade Fixed Effect
Mental Stress Social Acclimation and Satisfaction










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
-0.168*** -0.186*** -0.134** -0.030 -0.130*** 0.098* 0.127** 0.012 0.152*** 0.097***
(0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.055) (0.044) (0.046) (0.030)
Female Teacher -0.017 -0.019 -0.033 -0.045 0.045 0.047 0.085 -0.023
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.057) (0.044) (0.054) (0.042)
Female Student 0.279*** 0.100** 0.146*** -0.026 -0.006 -0.159*** -0.011 -0.121***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.039) (0.043) (0.048) (0.036) (0.039)
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 7,075 6,930 6,930 6,930 6,930 6,930
R-squared 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.049 0.088 0.113 0.228 0.234
Notes: Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school. Student control includes: student’s age, academic ranking in primary school,
mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attend kindergarten, and whether repeated a
grade in primary school. Teacher control includes: subject teacher’s age, teaching experience, education, and dummy variables indicating married, has certificate credential,
and graduated from a normal college. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Teacher ×
Female Student
0.153** 0.342*** 0.036 0.161***
(0.072) (0.070) (0.039) (0.040)
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,100 8,297 4,330 3,564
R-squared 0.244 0.058
Notes: Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school. Student control includes:
student’s age, academic ranking in primary school, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables
indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attend kindergarten, and whether repeated a grade
in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A 1.7. Robustness Check: Sample Attrition















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Teacher 0.002 -0.006 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.025 0.026 0.018 0.018 0.015
(0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
School Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,389 19,389 8,988 8,988 8,988 8,988 8,988 8,988 8,988 8,988
R-squared 0.082 0.079 0.078 0.080 0.078 0.079 0.082 0.083 0.079 0.079
Notes: Female teacher indicates female subject teacher in column (1) and column (2), and indicates female head teacher from column (3) to column (10). Each cell represents
a separate regression in which the dependent variable is the sample attrition dummy for each outcome as listed above, and the independent variable is a dummy for female
teacher. Standard errors are clustered at class level. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A 2.1. Robustness Check: Nonlinear Effects of Gender Peer on Academic and Noncognitive Outcomes
Academic outcomes Mental stress Social acclimation and satisfaction Disciplinary problems




















20%-40% 0.302*** -0.067 -0.560*** -0.798*** -0.453** -0.566 0.759*** 0.191* -0.189 -0.136 0.022 0.087
(0.091) (0.135) (0.164) (0.191) (0.182) (0.408) (0.170) (0.098) (0.208) (0.146) (0.153) (0.116)
40%-60% 0.246*** -0.089 -0.510*** -0.781*** -0.473** -0.607 0.750*** 0.254** -0.153 -0.051 -0.001 -0.009
(0.094) (0.136) (0.167) (0.193) (0.185) (0.412) (0.180) (0.102) (0.235) (0.182) (0.162) (0.116)
60%-80% 0.369*** -0.068 -0.488*** -0.765*** -0.505*** -0.634 0.792*** 0.362*** -0.134 0.016 -0.029 -0.037
(0.113) (0.147) (0.176) (0.201) (0.191) (0.415) (0.183) (0.106) (0.235) (0.189) (0.166) (0.115)
80%-100% 1.044*** 0.513*** -0.825*** -0.391* -0.010 -0.028 0.924*** 0.294*** -0.756*** -0.511** -0.544*** -0.138
(0.119) (0.149) (0.180) (0.206) (0.193) (0.417) (0.187) (0.109) (0.241) (0.197) (0.172) (0.119)
Female student 0.411*** 0.174*** 0.156*** -0.037 0.048** -0.067*** 0.083*** -0.026 0.045** 0.019 -0.087*** -0.095***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023)
Subject fixed Yes Yes NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
School fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,735 25,277 8,294 8,268 8,285 8,260 8,365 8,427 8,219 8,191 8,440 8,434
R-squared 0.080 0.024 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.043 0.084 0.084 0.219 0.223 0.075 0.076
Notes: The omitted category is the share of female peer in classroom of 0-20%. Test score and self-assessment score are normalized by subject, grade and school, to obtain a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one.Individual controls include: student’s age, mother’s education, father’s education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in family, whether attended
kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary school. Standard errors are clustered at class level and reported in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A 2.2. Robustness Check: Placebo Test






Female student -0.036*** -0.101*** -0.025*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.014)
School fixed Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations Yes Yes Yes
R-squared Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Individual controls include: student’s age, mother’s education, father’s
education, and dummy variables indicating minority, local residence, only child in
family, whether attended kindergarten, and repeated a grade in primary school.
Standard errors are clustered at class level and reported in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
170
Table A 2.3. Robustness Check: Sample Attrition
Academic outcomes Mental stress Social acclimation and satisfaction Disciplinary problems



















-0.013 -0.035 -0.017 -0.026 -0.015 -0.016 -0.059 -0.037 -0.002 -0.010 -0.031 -0.046
(0.051) (0.039) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046) (0.043) (0.038) (0.039)
Own gender control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject fixed Yes Yes NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
School fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,730 26,730 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910
R-squared 0.043 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.029 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.029
Notes:Each column represents a separate regression with specification (1), and the dependent variable is the attrition dummy for each outcome variable as listed above. Standard errors are clustered at
class level and reported in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A 3.1. Name List of TCZ Cities in 1988
Beijing Jilin Quanzhou Changsha Hezhou Zhangye
Beijing Jilin Zhangzhou Zhuzhou Hechi Ningxia
Tianjin Siping Longyan Xiangtan Chongqing Yinchuan
Tianjin Tonghua Jiangxi Hengyang Chongqing Shizuishan
Hebei Shanghai Nanchang Yueyang Sichuan Xinjiang
Shijiazhuang Jiangsu Pingxiang Changde Chengdu Urumqi
Tangshan Nanjing Jiujiang Zhangjiajie Zigong
Handan Wuxi Yingtan Yiyang Panzhihua
Xingtai Xuzhou Ganzhou Chenzhou Luzhou
Baoding Changzhou ji'an Huaihua Deyang
Zhangjiakou Suzhou Shandong Loudi Mianyang
Chengde Nantong Jinan Guangdong Suining
Hengshui Yangzhou Qingdao Guangzhou Neijiang
Shanxi Zhenjiang Zibo Shaoguan Leshan
Taiyuan Taizhou Zaozhuang Shenzhen Nanchong
Datong Zhejiang Yantai Zhuhai Yibin
Yangquan Hangzhou Weifang Shantou Guang'an
Shuozhou Ningbo Jining Foshan Meishan
Yuncheng Wenzhou Taian Jiangmen Guizhou
Xinzhou Jiaxing Laiwu Zhanjiang Guiyang
Linfen Huzhou Dezhou Zhaoqing Zunyi
Inner Mongolia Shaoxing Henan Huizhou Anshun
Huhhot Jinhua Zhengzhou Shanwei Yunnan
Baotou Quzhou Luoyang Qingyuan Kunming
Wuhai Taizhou Anyang Dongguan Qujing
Chifeng Anhui Jiaozuo Zhongshan Yuxi
Liaoning Wuhu Sanmenxia Chaozhou Zhaotong
Shenyang Maanshan Hubei Jieyang Shaanxi
Dalian Tongling Wuhan Yunfu Xian
Anshan Huangshan Huangshi Guangxi Tongchuan
Fushun Xuancheng Yichang Nanning Weinan
Benxi Chaohu Ezhou Liuzhou Shangluo
Jinzhou Fujian Jingmen Guilin Gansu
Fuxin Fuzhou Jingzhou Wuzhou Lanzhou
Liaoyang Xiamen Xianning Guigang Jinchang
Huludao Sanming Hunan Yulin Baiyin
Notes: The bold words indicate the corresponding provinces of the cities.
Data source: The State Council's official document- "The Official Reply of the State Council
Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas and SO2 Pollution Control Areas".
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Table A 3.2. Keywords for Environmentally Related Patents
Jie neng (Energy Conservation) Taiyang neng (Solar Energy) Huan bao (environmental protection)
Huan jing (environment) Wu ran (pollution) kongqi (air)
Jing hua (cleansing) Guo lv (filtration) Jie dian (power saving)
Jie shui(water saving) Fei shui (waste water) Jie mei (Coal saving)
Neng yuan (Energy) Jie You (Oil saving) Jian wu (pollution reduction)
Notes: The table presents the key words we applied to search for the environmentally related patents in the
dataset. The words in the parentheses are the English version of the Chinese words. To determine the words,
we randomly select and manually read 150 items of patent information for each year, and to this end, we read
150*16=8000 items and have 15 key words.
